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Abstract
We study the inefficiencies stemming from a firm’s operating flexibility under debt. We
find that flexibility in replenishing or liquidating inventory, by providing risk shifting incentives,
could lead to borrowing costs that erase more than a third of the firm’s value. In this context,
we examine the effectiveness of practical and widely used covenants in restoring firm value by
limiting such risk shifting behavior. We find that simple financial covenants can fully restore
value for a firm that possesses a mid-season inventory liquidation option. In the presence
of added flexibility in replenishing or partially liquidating inventory, financial covenants fail,
but simple borrowing base covenants successfully restore firm value. Explicitly characterizing
optimal covenant tightness for all these cases, we find that better market conditions, such
as lower inventory depreciation rate, higher gross margins or increased product demand, are
typically associated with tighter covenants. Our results suggest that inventory-heavy firms
can reap the full benefits of additional operating flexibility, irrespective of their leverage, by
entering simple debt contracts of the type commonly employed in practice. For such contracts
to be effective, however, firms with enhanced flexibility and/or operating in better markets must
also be willing to abide by more and/or tighter covenants.
1 Introduction
Operating flexibility, i.e., the ability to adapt after uncertainty resolution, carries benefits that are
widely documented in the literature. These benefits notwithstanding, flexibility may also cause
inefficiencies by increasing borrowing costs due to agency issues. Shielded by limited liability, firms
could use their flexibility to adapt operations in ways that benefit them at the expense of their
creditors. Because debt is priced higher to reflect such risk shifting capabilities, agency costs are
introduced, resulting in a loss of firm value (Myers 1977). This pitfall has been largely ignored in
the OM literature, which has focused primarily on the benefits of increased flexibility, traded off
against potential implementation costs.
∗Iancu (daniancu@stanford.edu) is from Stanford GSB, Trichakis (ntrichakis@hbs.edu) is from Harvard Business
School, Tsoukalas (gtsouk@wharton.upenn.edu) is from the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania.
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In practice, however, such “flexibility-driven” agency costs can be substantial and all-the-more
difficult to alleviate due to the inherent incompleteness of debt contracts, i.e., their inability to
fully contract upon all future operating decisions (Aghion and Bolton 1992). For instance, while
inventory-heavy firms have considerable latitude in managing their inventory levels, common debt
agreements rarely prescribe or constrain such decisions in a direct way (DeAngelo et al. 2002).
Covenants, i.e., requirements that borrowers must meet and that allow debtholders to take control
in case of violation,1 have been suggested as a practical, albeit “roundabout” way to reduce agency
costs (Smith and Warner 1979). But while existing theory clearly explains how covenants work, it
does not discuss how well they work, that is, the extent to which practical covenants commonly used
in debt agreements mitigate agency issues stemming from operating flexibility. By providing little
guidance on how covenants should be crafted as a function of firm characteristics, existing theory
is also insufficiently “operational” (Bolton 2013). The design and effectiveness of covenants thus
emerge as deciding factors in unlocking the full value of flexibility, with the potential to ultimately
shape a firm’s operating strategy.
Our paper takes a first step towards addressing these important issues by examining them in the
context of inventory management, arguably the operating capability most studied in the operations
management literature. To illustrate, in this context, how firm value can be compromised by
covenants that do not adequately reflect operating flexibility, we recall the now infamous example
of L.A. Gear, a high growth fashion retailer whose lightning rise as a top-performing stock on the
NYSE in the 1990’s was matched by one of “industry’s most spectacular collapses.” (DeAngelo et al.
2002). Faced with a declining market and tight covenant requirements, L.A. Gear’s management
began to systematically liquidate inventory at fire-sale prices, in order to raise emergency cash in
an attempt to avoid covenant violations and meet interest obligations. The firm gradually burned
through its inventory and ultimately declared bankruptcy.2 According to DeAngelo et al. (2002),
“This large liquidation of noncash current assets was made possible by the firm’s large
inventory and accounts receivable beginning balances, with declines in these two items
together fully accounting for the overall decline in current assets. [...] L.A. Gear’s debt
covenants clearly did not eliminate [management]’s ability to liquidate working capital
to fund its various strategic experiments. One possible reason is that [...] working-
capital liquidations fall into a gray area that is difficult to constrain in a productive
way, since they are not an outright sale of assets but are instead decisions made in the
routine course of business not to replace liquid assets as they are drawn down.”
This example highlights how poorly designed covenants may not adequately restrict risk shifting
behavior, and may even distort operating decisions, e.g., by inducing excessive asset liquidations.
1Although debt contracts include several types of covenants (Hilson 2013), our work focuses on performance-based
covenants that rely on financial metrics, which are widely used in practice (Nini et al. 2009, Roberts and Sufi 2009a).
2For a study of the relation between inventory levels and stock prices, see Gaur et al. (2014).
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Our study takes the perspective of an inventory-heavy firm (e.g., a retailer or manufacturer)
facing uncertain demand that can issue competitively priced debt to fund its inventory investments.
We model operations using the classical newsvendor paradigm, supplemented with an intermediate
period during which the firm is afforded different degrees of operating flexibility to adjust inventory
in response to observed sales. To isolate the role of this flexibility in generating agency costs, we
abstract away from other sources of agency issues (such as information asymmetry), and preserve
contract incompleteness by preventing the explicit constraining of future inventory decisions as
part of the debt agreement. We instead allow debt contracts to include covenant terms commonly
employed in practice, specifically, financial and borrowing base covenants (Roberts and Sufi 2009a).
Debt contract terms and inventory decisions are determined endogenously. Inventory decisions
remain with the firm as long as covenants are not breached, and are otherwise transferred to
debtholders, who can seize and liquidate firm inventory to accelerate debt repayment.
Our Contributions
The model we develop yields two main novel insights.
1) We show that flexibility stemming from inventory management capabilities can generate sur-
prisingly substantial agency costs for leveraged firms—potentially amounting to more than a third
of firm value—when debt contracts do not include covenants (see Section 2 for details). We further
find that inventory policies can be significantly distorted, both at inception and at the intermediate
decision point. Specifically, we show that firms may under-order ex-ante and follow counterintuitive
inventory liquidation policies ex-post, preferring continuation when operating results are weak and
liquidation when they are strong. Whereas the former effect is in line with existing theory, the
latter has not previously been demonstrated (see Sections 4 and 5).
2) We show that the aforementioned agency costs and operating distortions can be fully alleviated
by simple covenants widely used in practice (e.g., financial and borrowing base covenants), provided
they are properly designed. We explicitly characterize the optimal types of covenants and their
restrictiveness (respectively referred to as “intensity” and “tightness” in the literature, Demiroglu
and James 2010) needed to restore firm value, and show how these are intrinsically related to three
factors, (i) degree of operating flexibility, (ii) product parameters (e.g., margin and depreciation),
and (iii) external market growth (see Sections 5 and 6).
These core insights suggest several implications and empirical predictions, discussed next.
• First, our findings send a clear message that an inventory-heavy firm contemplating oper-
ational changes to enhance flexibility, such as lead time reduction to accommodate mid-season
replenishment or additional sales channels to allow for (partial) inventory liquidation, should not
hesitate to finance its operations through debt; by suitably structuring its debt contracts, it can
reap the full benefits of extra flexibility, irrespective of leverage. These findings nuance and even
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counter certain predictions in the finance literature that increased (production) flexibility will be
accompanied by increased agency costs, tighter credit terms and reduced debt capacity (MacKay
2003). The implicit assumption underlying such predictions is that covenants used in practice are
insufficiently potent to eliminate agency costs that result from a firm’s operating flexibility. Our
model shows that this is not necessarily the case for inventory-heavy firms. We believe this link
between operating flexibility and covenant effectiveness could be empirically tested (see Section 7.2.)
• Second, we highlight the way operating capabilities and parameters are reflected in covenant
design. We show that in the case of a firm that possesses a mid-season option to make all-or-
nothing (“0-1”) liquidation decisions, such as discontinuing product lines or closing stores, simple
financial covenants would suffice to fully restore firm value. When the firm has added flexibility
to adjust inventory, for instance through replenishment and/or partial liquidations, as in the L.A.
Gear case, financial covenants fail, leading to operating distortions and loss of value. However, we
show that the addition of simple borrowing base covenants specifying an optimal haircut on the
value of inventory succeeds in fully alleviating agency issues. These findings are summarized in
Table 1. Our optimal characterization of covenant intensity and tightness as a function of operating
parameters, moreover, yields a series of new predictions of interest to the empirical literature in
accounting and finance that examines covenant tightness. In particular, we find that better market
conditions, such as lower inventory depreciation rate, higher gross margins and increased product
demand, typically lead to tighter covenants. These insights are further discussed in Section 7.2.
Contract
Newsvendor 0-1 Liquidation Partial Liq. / Replenishment
(no flex) (medium flex) (high flex)
Interest-rate-only 3 7 7
Financial covenant 3 3 7
Borrowing base covenant 3 3 3
Table 1: Optimal debt contracts required as a function of the firm’s operating flexibility. Check marks indicate
feasibility of the contract in completely alleviating agency costs and restoring firm value. For instance, contracts that
only include an interest rate are sufficient for a newsvendor (with no flexibility), but fail under added flexibility.
From a managerial perspective, our findings suggest that for debt contracts to be effective
in practice, firms with enhanced flexibility and/or operating in better markets should be willing
to abide by more and/or tighter covenants. This may seem counterintuitive to an operator, as
(i) better markets may seem to be more “secure,” and (ii) covenants clearly restrict the firm’s
operating discretion. Our model nevertheless predicts that optimally crafted covenants can fully
mitigate agency issues, and are thus in a firm’s best interest. Managerial implications are further
discussed in Section 7.1.
• Extending our model to capture how competition in the lending market can affect results, we
examine the extreme case in which the lender acts as a monopoly. We find inventory-heavy firms
to face more covenants as competition in the lending market wanes, and covenants to no longer be
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sufficient to restore firm value.
• Our model also shows the relationship between covenant inclusion and bankruptcy risk to
be more subtle than previously reported in the literature, and critically dependent on competition
in the lending market and residual growth in product demand. Table 2, which illustrates this
relationship, shows that it is possible that covenants are included and the equilibrium probability
of bankruptcy is zero. Also, it is possible in equilibrium that the risk of bankruptcy exists but
covenants are not included in the debt contract. The table highlights, moreover, that covenants
become more prevalent as competition in the lending market wanes or demand growth rate increases.
perfect competition
“low” market growth “high” market growth
covenants imply
bankruptcy risk
covenants imply and are
implied by bankruptcy risk
covenants neither imply
nor are implied by
bankruptcy risk
bankruptcy risk implies
covenants
monopoly
Table 2: Connection between bankruptcy risk and the inclusion of covenants.
The model extension for the monopolistic lending market is included in the Appendix B. Model
limitations and future directions are summarized in Section 7.3.
Literature Review
Our work lies at the interface of operational and financial decision-making, an area pioneered
by several recent papers. For instance, Xu and Birge (2004) and Dada and Hu (2008) extend the
newsvendor model to include financing constraints, and show how these can affect the optimal order
quantity or capacity choice. The focus here is on short-term financing in the form of trade credit
or debt. We refer the reader to Kouvelis (2012) for a review of this literature. None of these papers
consider a dynamic setting, where agency issues due to risk shifting could be relevant. Several papers
in operations have discussed dynamic inventory decisions under capital constraints or leverage (e.g.,
Porteus 1972, Archibald et al. 2002, Gong et al. 2014), but without modeling strategic interactions
or endogenizing debt contract terms. Boyabatlı et al. (2015) study the interplay of operational and
financial flexility, albeit in a different context than ours.
Closer to our work, Boyabatlı and Toktay (2011) examine a firm’s optimal choice of flexible
capacity under leverage in a static setting, finding that firms are more likely to choose flexible
capacity when they use secured loans, and when they face less demand variability. Critically
different from our model, flexibility does not create any agency issues in Boyabatlı and Toktay
(2011), as it cannot be used to shift risk. To the best of our knowledge, only two papers in the
operations literature examine the relationship between the agency costs of debt and flexibility.
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Chod and Zhou (2014) study a newsvendor-style firm that first secures debt, and then chooses
whether to invest in flexible or inflexible (but cheaper) resources. Risk shifting arises when the
latter option is chosen, as inflexible resources are “riskier” than flexible ones. Thus, in this static
model, increased (resource) flexibility does not accentuate agency issues, but rather reduces them.
In contrast, our emphasis is on studying the risk shifting potential that operating flexibility can
introduce, which can only be captured in a dynamic setting. Finally, Chod (2015) study the role
of trade credit in alleviating the agency costs of debt. The focus is on a newsvendor-style firm that
first secures funding—through bank debt or trade credit—and then places orders for two types of
products. The author shows how agency costs arise under (interest-only) debt financing, as the firm
can order the “riskier” product once debt is in place. In contrast, when trade credit is provided by
a single supplier who can directly contract upon the individual order quantities, agency costs are
fully alleviated. While both Chod (2015) and the present paper discuss agency costs arising from
operating flexibility, the papers differ dramatically in focus: the former looks at trade credit, while
we examine the efficiency and optimal design of common financial contracts (with covenants).
On a broader level, our work is related to a large body of accounting, finance and economics
literature that deals with agency issues and contractual incompleteness. Seminal works include
Jensen and Meckling (1976), Myers (1977), Grossman and Hart (1986), and Aghion and Bolton
(1992). Smith and Warner (1979) were the first to describe how covenants can be used to counter
agency issues, whereas Leland (1994) argued how net worth covenants can mitigate agency issues
occasioned by risk shifting. The literature on the role of covenants in alleviating agency and
incompleteness is vast, and we make no attempt to survey it here—we refer the interested reader
to Bolton and Dewatripont (2004), Tirole (2006), and references therein.
Several papers within this stream study agency costs derived from different types of flexibility,
see, e.g., Childs et al. (2005), Leland (1998), Moyen (2007), Titman et al. (2004). The focus is on
comparative statics to assess the directional impact of flexibility on such costs and/or numerical
studies to quantify the magnitude of costs. Mello and Parsons (1992) and Manso (2008) study
special forms of operating flexibility (captured through switching costs), with the latter deriving
upper bounds on the agency costs. None of these papers look at the effectiveness of optimally
designed covenants in alleviating agency costs, which is the primary focus of our paper.
Closer to our work, some recent papers focus on quantifying agency costs and covenant effec-
tiveness. Gamba and Triantis (2014) compares the effectiveness of different types of covenants used
in practice through a detailed numerical study, showing that covenants could restore anywhere
from 0% to 90% of the firm value loss. Matvos (2013) develops a structural model to measure
which types of covenants are most effective in practice, finding that covenant presence is essen-
tial, but—once covenants are chosen—the benefits of “fine-tuning” them is marginal. In contrast,
we find that significant firm value could be at stake if covenant tightness is not properly set (see
Section 2). Neither of these papers looks at optimal covenant design. Berlin and Mester (1992),
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Sridhar and Magee (1997) and Gaˆrleanu and Zwiebel (2009) study the relation between optimal
covenant design/tightness and renegotiation, which becomes important under information frictions.
We instead study how to optimally design covenants in order to mitigate agency issues caused by
(varying degrees of) operating flexibility, which, to the best of our knowledge, has not been looked
at before. Moreover, the aforementioned papers do not focus on quantifying covenant effectiveness.
In Section 7.2, we review several empirical papers in the literature studying covenant tightness,
intensity, effectiveness that our work nuances and is either aligned with, or even counters.
2 Quantifying Agency Costs
Before introducing the modeling details and analysis, it will be useful to gain a better understanding
of the magnitude of the effects discussed in the introduction. Are flexibility-driven agency costs
a first order effect in our setting? To assess this, we first measure the potential value created by
inventory flexibility, and then quantify how much of this value can be erased under leverage.
We rely on a base case newsvendor model, denoted by N , with a single selling season [0, 2]. To
introduce operating flexibility, we extend this model by splitting the selling season into two periods,
[0, 1] and [1, 2], and in the spirit of Fisher et al. (2001), we allow an opportunity to adjust inventory
in response to observed sales inbetween. We refer to this model as the “flexvendor.” As alluded to
in the introduction, we study different degrees of the flexvendor’s flexibility in adjusting inventory.
In this section, we consider the highest degree of flexibility, where the flexvendor can fully adjust
inventory either by partial liquidation or replenishment, and study the following two variations:
F : a flexvendor with ample capital, who requires no debt financing.
F lev: a leveraged flexvendor, who primarily relies on debt financing through competitively-
priced debt contracts that only include an interest rate.
The flexvendor model is rooted in reality, and motivated by the decision process faced by firms
carrying inventory that depreciates in value over time. In particular, we are inspired by the case of
Hewlett Packard (HP), which attempted to enter the tablet market in the summer of 2011, with two
TouchPad devices (16GB and 32GB versions) that were based on HP’s proprietary webOS software.
As of August 2011, the two devices retailed for $399.99 and $499.99, respectively (Rapaport and
Tracer 2011). Over the course of the month, HP’s sales were extremely disappointing, while its
competitors were rapidly gaining market share. It soon became apparent that HP’s software could
become obsolete, unable to compete with the Apple and Android ecosystems. As a result, towards
the end of August 2011, HP decided to completely liquidate its webOS line of tablets, at fire-sale
prices. After some price experimentation, the retail liquidation prices were set at $249.99 and
$299.99, respectively (Wikipedia 2011).
We rely on this example to calibrate the flexvendor’s operating parameters, namely prices
and unit cost. As HP’s primary distribution channel was through wholesale to its retail partners
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(e.g., Best Buy), we need estimates of HP’s wholesale prices during normal operations, and during
liquidation. According to Damodaran (2015), retail consumer electronics margins averaged 18.38%
in 2011. This implies tablet wholesale prices of around $338 (16GB) and $422 (32GB), during
normal operations, and $211 (16GB) and $253 (32GB) during the liquidation. Furthermore, HP’s
unit costs—including parts and labor—were estimated at around $306.15 (16GB) and $328.15
(32GB), (Wikipedia 2011). Averaging across the two devices, we obtain an average unit cost of
around 83% of wholesale, and an average liquidation price of around 61% of wholesale.
Accordingly, we normalize the flexvendor selling price to 1, and set the unit ordering cost
to 0.83 (in both periods) and the liquidation value to 0.61 at time 1. To capture the webOS
technological obsolescence, there is no salvage value at time 2. Further, we assume first period
demand is uniformly distributed between [0, 10], and the second period demand—conditioned on
the first period realized demand being d1—is uniformly distributed in [0, 2d1]. F lev uses equity of
0.2, so that the purchase is primarily financed by debt. The profits are also normalized to ease
exposition, such that the expected profits of N are set at 100, see Figure 1(a).
Comparing the newsvendor N in Figure 1(a) to the flexvendor F in Figure 1(b) highlights the
value of inventory flexibility: the flexvendor extracts profits of 235, a 135% increase compared to
the newsvendor. This also represents the “first best” outcome for the flexvendor, i.e., the total
profits or firm value achievable with flexibility, and without any financial frictions.
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Figure 1: The value of operating flexibility: (a) Newsvendor vs. (b) Flexvendor
Introducing debt financing leads to agency issues, as the leveraged flexvendor—shielded by lim-
ited liability—can use his additional operating flexibility to adjust the inventory level in risky ways,
e.g., by carrying too much inventory into the second period (this intuition is formalized in Section 4).
This leads to some rather striking results. If debtholders do not anticipate this risk shifting po-
tential, the leveraged flexvendor could expropriate wealth from them, and beat first best, as shown
in Figure 2(a). Under equilibrium pricing, debtholders fully anticipate risk shifting and increase
borrowing rates in response, which introduces agency costs, as shown in Figure 2(b). Consequently,
the leveraged flexvendor achieves profits of 160, which are 32% lower than the flexvendor’s first
best. This loss is substantial, suggesting that flexibility-driven agency costs can be a dominant
8
effect in our setting,3 potentially shaping operations strategy. For instance, consider the situation
where the newsvendor would need to invest 100 to obtain the reordering/liquidation flexibility of
the flexvendor. In the absence of financial frictions, such an investment would be fully justified,
yielding a net benefit of 135−100 = 35. However, under financial frictions, the net benefit becomes
60− 100 = −40, rendering the investment unattractive.
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Figure 2: How a leveraged flexvendor could shift risk to extract wealth from non-anticipating debtholders (a), and how
agency costs are created when debtholders anticipate this behavior in equilibrium (b), in the context of interest-only
debt contracts.
To evaluate the potential of covenants in alleviating agency costs, we now consider the case
where the debt contract for the leveraged flexvendor includes a simple financial covenant of varying
tightness, evaluated between the two periods. In particular, the covenant requires that the cash
generated from sales in the first period meet a minimum threshold. The covenant becomes tighter
as the required threshold increases. Upon covenant violation, the decision rights are transferred to
the debtholders. Figure 3 illustrates the effectiveness of a covenant with (a) low, (b) medium or
(c) high tightness in mitigating the value losses. It is interesting to note that the three covenants
reduce agency costs to (a) 13%, (b) 4.5%, and (c) 7.5%, respectively, so that effectiveness is non-
monotonic in covenant tightness. The intuition behind this is that if the covenant is too loose,
risk shifting activities are not adequately restricted. However, if the covenant is too tight, then
the debtholders essentially control the firm after the first period, and take decisions that are also
inefficient. We discuss this extensively in Section 5.
While this simple example sets the stage, it leaves much unanswered: How effective are financial
covenants in mitigating flexibility-driven agency costs and restoring firm value? Is one covenant
enough, or are more needed? How should the covenant intensity and tightness be structured as
a function of the product (price, margin, salvage), the market (demand growth), and the firm’s
operating capabilities (reordering and liquidation options)? The rest of the paper seeks answers to
3We conducted several robustness checks, by varying all parameters in this model, and the magnitude of the effect
persisted. We note that these costs are larger than values reported in other studies. For instance, Chod (2015) reports
agency costs of less than 8% in a single-period inventory model, while Gamba and Triantis (2014) report costs as
large as 18% (albeit in a very different model specification).
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Figure 3: Quantifying how much value covenants can restore for the leveraged flexvendor, as a function of tightness.
these questions.
3 Model
We introduce the flexvendor model by considering a newsvendor who has an early exit option,
i.e., an intermediate time-step at which all remaining inventory can be liquidated, before fully
depreciating (we return to study the flexvendor with replenishment flexibility in Section 6).
3.1 Flexvendor With a Liquidation Option
We consider a setting in which a firm can purchase a single type of product at time t = 0, at unit
cost c > 0. The number of units to purchase is denoted by q; full payment of c q is due upon delivery
of the purchased units, which occurs with zero lead time. There are two selling periods, over which
products are sold at price p = 1 > c. At t = 1, the first period random demand D1 is realized, and
fulfilled to the largest extent possible from the initial inventory of q units. We assume that D1 has
non-negative support, cumulative distribution function (c.d.f.) F1 and probability density function
(p.d.f.) f1, and denote a realization with d1.
At this point, a participating firm faces two options: it can either liquidate (e.g., salvage) the
remaining inventory (q − d1)+ (if any) at unit price s < c and exit the market immediately, or
continue operating for a second selling period. The decision to continue or liquidate, denoted by
` ∈ {0, 1}, is based on the information set at t = 1, which consists of the realized demand d1.
If the firm chooses to continue, i.e., ` = 0, the second period demand D2 is realized and
fulfilled at t = 2, to the largest extent possible. We assume that D2 depends on d1, specifically,
D2|{D1 = d1} =
(
M−1
2 d1
)
Z, where Z is a non-negative random variable with unit mean, and
M > 1 is a parameter determining the demand growth rate, or market strength. In particular, since
E[D2|D1 = d1] = M−12 d1, demand is projected to increase if M ≥ 3, and decrease otherwise. We
refer to these cases as follows.
Definition 1. When M ≥ 3 (M < 3), we say that the market is non-shrinking (shrinking).
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Unmet demand is lost without any penalty in both periods, and any remaining inventory is dis-
posed of, without salvage value or cost.4 For simplicity, we assume a zero discount rate throughout
the analysis. The value extracted from such a market under an initial order q is thus given by the
firm’s expected profit,
V (q) = ED1
[
min(D1, q) + max
`∈{0,1}
{
` · s(q −D1)+ + (1− `) · ED2|D1
[
min
(
D2, (q −D1)+
)]}]
, (1)
and the firm chooses q at t = 0 so as to maximize V (q). Let V fb
def
= maxq≥0 V (q) denote the
optimal extracted value, and qfb denote the associated optimal order quantity, henceforth referred
to as first best.
3.2 Leveraged Flexvendor
A firm (e.g., a retailer) R operates in the setting described above. When the firm’s initial capital x0
is insufficient to cover the inventory cost cq, it can obtain debt financing from a perfectly competitive
lending market. More precisely, a bank B (“she”) can extend a loan for the amount w def= (cq−x0)+,5
under a contract with the following (T)erms and (C)ontingencies.
[T1] (Interest rate and repayment) Payment of principal plus interest charges (at rate r) is due at
t = 2. For ease of exposition, we consider R = 1 + r in the remainder of the paper, and refer
to it simply as the interest rate. The amount due at t = 2 is then Rw.
[T2] (Collateral and withdrawal) The bank obtains perfect security interest in the entire inventory
(to be) purchased by the firm. All cash generated by selling the inventory is remitted to a
lockbox account controlled by the bank, and the firm is unable to access the funds until the
entire loan proceeds Rw are fully repaid, at t = 2. In other words, the lockbox account has
a zero withdrawal limit.
[C1] (Financial covenant) In period t = 1, the firm’s cash flow min(d1, q) is required to exceed a
threshold δ. Failure to abide by the covenant is considered an event of default, which gives
the bank full control rights, as well as the ability to request immediate repayment of all due
principal plus interest, Rw.
[C2] (Borrowing base covenant) In period t = 1, the firm’s borrowing base is calculated using an
advance rate of 1 for cash and α ∈ [0, 1) for inventory, and is thus equal to min(d1, q)+α s (q−
d1)
+. The borrowing base is required to exceed a threshold β, and as with [C1], failure to
conform triggers an event of default, and carries the same repercussions.
4The assumption of zero salvage at t = 2 simplifies exposition, without affecting our structural results and insights.
5We implicitly assume that all available equity is used to purchase the inventory at t = 0. Absent other consider-
ations, this is without loss (Kouvelis and Zhao 2012).
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All contracts we consider include terms [T1-2]. We denote the set of contracts that include no
contingencies by K∅, and refer to such contracts as interest-rate-only contracts. Similarly, let KF
be the set of contracts that include a financial covenant [C1] only, and KB the set of contracts that
include a borrowing base covenant [C2] only. It is worth noting that a borrowing base covenant
is more general than a financial (i.e., cash flow based) covenant, since the latter can always be
replicated through the former by taking α = 0 and β = δ. As such, K∅ ⊂ KF ⊂ KB.
We consider separate model specifications, in which contracts are chosen from either K∅, KF or
KB. To simplify notation, we denote any contract with κ.
3.2.1 Timing of Events
We study the game under perfect and symmetric information between the two players, R and B.
At t = 0, the firm chooses an order quantity q, and the bank chooses the terms (and contingencies)
in the loan contract κ.
At t = 1, demand d1 is revealed to both players and fulfilled, generating a cash flow of min(d1, q)
for the firm. As described above, the firm has the option of continuing operating for a second selling
period, or liquidating any leftover inventory at s and exiting the market. If the latter option is
chosen, the firm uses generated cash flow and liquidation revenues, equal to min(d1, q)+s(q−d1)+,
to repay its debt of Rw. Let `R : R × R → {0, 1} denote the firm’s liquidation policy, with
`R(q, d1) = 1 if and only if the firm liquidates when the initial inventory is q, and D1 = d1.
If the firm chooses to continue operating and the contract includes a covenant, then the bank
evaluates the covenant requirement. If it is breached, the bank has the option of forcing liquidation
in order to secure full payment of the debt. In case the bank exercises this option, she seizes
remaining inventory and liquidates it at unit price s. All proceeds from sales and liquidation are
first used towards debt servicing. If the bank is made whole, the remaining revenues are returned
to the firm. Similar to our previous notation, let `B : R×R→ {0, 1} denote the liquidation policy
of the bank. Note that, unless a covenant is included in the contract and it is breached, the bank
does not have any right to influence the liquidation/continuation decision.
When the firm chooses to continue and the bank does not force liquidation, the second period
demand D2 is realized and filled to the largest extent possible. At t = 2, the generated sales revenues
from the two periods are first used to repay the debt Rw, and the firm keeps any remaining cash
and exits the market.
In this setting, the firm’s and the bank’s cash flows at the end of the game under the liquidation
event6 L (irrespective of the party choosing that option) and continuation event C
def
= L c are
6More formally, L
def
= {`R(q,D1) = 1}∪
{V ∩{`B(q,D1) = 1}}, where V is the event corresponding to a covenant
breach, i.e., V def= {κ ∈ KF ∩ {min(q, d1) < δ}} ∪ {κ ∈ KB ∩ {min(q, d1) + αs(q − d1)+ < β}}.
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respectively given by
XR,L (q,D1) =
(
min(D1, q) + s(q −D1)+ −Rw
)+
, XR,C (q,D1, D2) = (min(D1 +D2, q)−Rw)+ ,
XB,L (q,D1) = min
{
Rw, min(D1, q) + s(q −D1)+
}
, XB,C (q,D1, D2) = min
{
Rw, min(D1 +D2, q)
}
.
For the firm, both expressions have a floor at 0, reflecting its limited liability. For clarity, we refer
to the game at t = 1 that determines whether L or C occurs as subgame S. The pure subgame
perfect equilibrium actions can be characterized via backward induction. When κ ∈ K∅, the game
only entails choices by the firm. When κ ∈ KF ∪KB, the outcome of the subgame S can be viewed
as a Stackelberg game, with the firm leading by choosing `R and the bank following by choosing
`B (see Figure 4(b)).
At t = 0, the expected profits of the two players can then be compactly expressed as
piR(q, κ) = E
[
XR,L (q,D1)1{L }+XR,C (q,D1, D2)1{C }
]− x0,
piB(q, κ) = E
[
XB,L (q,D1)1{L }+XB,C (q,D1, D2)1{C }
]− w,
where 1 is an indicator function. The firm chooses the order quantity q so as to maximize its
expected profit piR(q, κ), and the bank chooses the debt contract terms κ so as to break even in
expectation, i.e., piB(q, κ) = 0. The sequence of all events is illustrated in Figure 4.
t = 0 t = 1 t = 2
demand revealed &contract
R, B D
L
....................︸ ︷︷ ︸ .........................︸ ︷︷ ︸ ..........................︸ ︷︷ ︸
subgame S with
outcomes C or L
demand
revealed
C
d2
D
S
{piR;piB}
{piR;piB}
d1q, κ
signed
(a) Game under perfect competition
violation
R
`R = 1
`R = 0
R
B
`B = 0
`B = 1
..........................︸ ︷︷ ︸
liquidation/
continuation
decisions
.............︸ ︷︷ ︸
covenant
evaluation
L
C
C
⇔
L
C
S
`R = 0
L
no
violation
(b) Subgame S
Figure 4: Game under perfect competition and subgame S for κ ∈ KF ∪KB (R=Firm, B=Bank, D=Demand).
Assumptions for Analysis
For the sake of analytical tractability, we also introduce the following simplifying assumptions. We
relax these in Section 6.
Assumption 1. The random variable Z that drives second period demand follows a two-point
distribution, taking values 0 and 2 with equal probability.
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The two-point distribution introduces an adverse (D2 = 0, for Z = 0) and a favorable scenario
(D2 = (M − 1)d1, for Z = 2) for the second period demand. Our choices of zero demand in
the adverse scenario and equally likely scenarios allow us to ease exposition, without affecting the
validity of the structural results.
Under Assumption 1, the probability of selling a unit of inventory over the second period is at
most 1/2, and the corresponding expected revenues are at most 1/2 as well, since the selling price
is 1. On the other hand, liquidation yields revenues of s per unit at t = 1. It is easy to see that,
unless s < 1/2, the firm would never prefer to continue in the second period, but rather behave
as a classical newsvendor who sells over one period and then liquidates (or salvages) his leftover
inventory. To circumvent this degeneracy, we introduce the following assumption:
Assumption 2. The liquidation price satisfies s < 1/2.
It is hardly surprising that an upper bound on the value of s is needed to eliminate trivial cases
when liquidation is always preferred.
3.3 Discussion of Modeling Assumptions
Business cycle. Our model extends the classical newsvendor framework by providing a liquidation
option at an intermediate point. This can correspond to a discontinuation of a division or product,
or a going out of business sale (Craig and Raman 2013). Paralleling the standard “salvaging”
assumption in the newsvendor setup, we assume that the entire leftover inventory at t = 1 can
be liquidated at a price s that is a-priori known, and independent of the quantity and first period
demand. While simplistic,7 this assumption adequately captures the mechanisms at play in our
setting, and becomes even more sensible when the bank is also endowed with a liquidation option.
In practice, such liquidations are typically contracted to an external party, such as Gordon Brothers
Group, Hilco Global, ES Group, etc. Such a liquidation house provides binding inventory appraisals
upfront (i.e., in period t = 0), and, in case of liquidation, purchases the entire inventory at a fixed
per-unit price, which reflects a pre-determined haircut on the original appraised value. Thus, any
remaining liquidation risk beyond this haircut is essentially transferred to the liquidation house
(see Craig and Raman 2013 for more details).
Demand distribution. Requiring D1 and D2 to be correlated is standard in the literature (Fisher
and Raman 1996). Our assumption of a discrete second period demand distribution has been
widely used in the literature in similar multi-period game-theoretic models (e.g., see Bolton and
Dewatripont 2004 and references in our literature review in Section 1). Despite its simplicity, the
7Cachon and Kok (2007) recognize that the effective salvaging price depends on remaining inventory, and discuss
appropriate ways for estimating this price. There is also an extensive literature in revenue management concerned
with optimal markdown, the practice of dynamically adjusting prices for remaining inventory at the end of a selling
season, for the purpose of freeing valuable shelf space (see, e.g., Talluri and Van Ryzin 2004 and Phillips 2005).
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two-point distribution is sufficiently rich to capture the main trade-offs driving the players’ dynamic
decisions, and the results derived are robust, as discussed in Section 6 and Section C.1.
Exogenous retail price. We note that the flexvendor in our model is assumed to be price-taking, as
in the classical newsvendor setting.
Collateral. Assuming the loan to be secured allows us to abstract away from potential complexities
related to the bank’s seniority in the capital structure.
No loan limit. In our model, given that the interest rate is determined endogenously, a loan limit
would be superfluous and is thus omitted. This is standard in the finance and the OM literatures
(Boyabatlı and Toktay 2011, Gaˆrleanu and Zwiebel 2009, Myers 1977, Xu and Birge 2004).
No cash diversion/dividends. The presence of a lockbox account and the implicit assumption of
no dividend payment are both common requirements in loan agreements (see Chapter 7 of Hilson
2013, pages 14 and 19). In our model, this allows abstracting away any additional agency issues
related to cash diversion, and focusing on agency issues exclusively due to operating flexibility.
No additional financing. Allowing the firm no access to other external capital (e.g., by new equity
or debt issuance) during the life of the contract is standard in the literature (see, e.g., Chod and
Zhou 2014, Gaˆrleanu and Zwiebel 2009, Myers 1977, Xu and Birge 2004). This allows focusing on
the relationship between the two agents.
Contingencies. Since the goal of our paper is to quantify the effectiveness of simple and practical
covenants in alleviating agency issues, the debt contracts we consider only include financial or
borrowing base covenants. Together with pricing grids, these are the most commonly used forms of
contingencies in practice, as documented by numerous empirical papers (Roberts and Sufi 2009a).
Financial covenant. Financial covenants involve various metrics, such as cash-flow-to-debt ratio,
net worth, interest rate coverage, EBIT to interest ratio, etc. (see, e.g., Dichev and Skinner 2002,
Roberts and Sufi 2009b, and pages 2-4 in Chapter 7 of Hilson 2013). In our base model, it turns
out that all such covenants translate into a minimum threshold requirement on the cash flow
or, equivalently, on the first period demand d1 (note that the covenant can never be breached
upon stock-out).8 The choice of a particular type of financial covenant is therefore without loss
of generality, so that we henceforth base our analysis and discussion on a minimum cash flow
threshold δ that controls the covenant tightness. Finally, entitlement to immediate debt payment
upon a covenant breach is routinely included in contracts (see page 17 in Chapter 7 of Hilson 2013).
Borrowing base covenant. The borrowing base is the value assigned to the borrower’s pledged assets,
calculated by applying particular advance rates against each type of collateral. These rates (i.e.,
8For instance, consider a covenant requiring the net worth to be higher than a threshold τ . For d1 < q, debt at
t = 1 is equal to Rw, and equity is equal to d1 + s(q − d1). The covenant then equivalently requires demand to be
higher than a threshold, i.e., d1 >
τ+Rw−sq
1−s .
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“hair-cuts”) are chosen by the lender as additional risk controls, reflecting the riskiness of each
asset class. Our assumption that cash and inventory have advance rates of 1 and α, respectively,
is consistent with common practice, where accounts receivable advance rates are often 90%-100%,
while inventory rates range from 50% to 90% (Buzacott and Zhang 2004, CH 2014). Most secured
contracts include contingencies requiring the borrowing base to exceed the size of the outstanding
debt throughout the life of the loan. We note that the covenant used in our model is slightly more
general, by requiring the borrowing base at t = 1 to exceed a value β, which is not necessarily equal
to the outstanding debt. We retain the terminology of “borrowing base covenant” for simplicity of
exposition. β controls the tightness of the covenant. A borrowing base requirement at t = 0 would
essentially be equivalent to a loan limit, which is superfluous as per our discussion above.
Bankruptcy costs and procedures. In the event of default, we only consider Chapter 7 bankruptcy
(“liquidation”), but not Chapter 11 (“reorganization”), which would involve having to model the
renegotiation process between the parties. Note also that, in view of our assumption of perfect and
symmetric information, a renegotiation process would be superfluous (see Gaˆrleanu and Zwiebel
2009). We also ignore bankruptcy costs. For a discussion on the effects of non-zero bankruptcy
costs and reorganization, we refer the reader to Birge and Yang (2013) and Birge et al. (2015).
4 Liquidation Policies
We analyze the players’ optimal liquidation policies in subgame S, at the intermediate time t = 1.
To provide a meaningful comparison, we start by deriving the first best policy.
4.1 First Best Liquidation Policy
When the order quantity is q, and the first period demand realization is D1 = d, the first best
policy can be readily derived as the optimal liquidation decision ` in (1).
Lemma 1 (First Best). The first best liquidation policy is a threshold one,
`fb(q, d) = 1{d < dfb(q)}, where dfb(q) def= sq
M−1
2 + s
.
Such a threshold policy is consistent with intuition and hardly surprising. Many studies dealing
with dynamic decisions under debt either de facto assume or derive such policies as optimal (see,
e.g., Babich and Sobel 2004, Gigler et al. 2009, Hart and Moore 1998, Morellec 2001, Swinney
and Netessine 2009). Furthermore, as one might intuitively expect, the threshold dfb is increasing
in q and s and decreasing in M , confirming that the propensity to liquidate increases with order
quantity and liquidation value, but decreases with the second period market strength.
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4.2 Leveraged Firm
Under debt, the firm’s liquidation decisions generally depart from first best. The optimal policy
turns out to critically depend on whether the order quantity q exceeds a particular threshold qD,
given by
qD
def
=

Rx0
Rc− 2s
M−1+2s
if M ≥ M˜ and s < s1D,
Rx0
Rc− sM
M+s−1
if M < M˜ and s < s2D,
∞ otherwise,
(2)
where M˜
def
= 2(1− s), s1D def= Rc(M−1)2(1−Rc) , s2D
def
= Rc(M−1)M−Rc . We introduce the following definitions.
Definition 2. When q > qD (q ≤ qD), we say that the firm is (not) sufficiently leveraged.
Definition 3. When M < M˜ (M ≥ M˜), we say that the market is (not) rapidly shrinking.
The first moniker is intuitive, since larger q is tantamount to a larger debt load. Note that whether
this condition holds critically depends on market parameters. In particular, firms are never suffi-
ciently leveraged when inventory does not depreciate too rapidly (i.e., s exceeds some critical value),
and an important distinction is drawn depending on whether markets are “rapidly shrinking,” as
captured in the second definition. Since M˜ < 2, a rapidly shrinking market is reflective of a second
period expected demand considerably below the first period realized demand, which is consistent
with (and stronger than) our earlier condition for a “shrinking market,” M < 3.
With these definitions, we now characterize the liquidation policy of a leveraged firm.
Lemma 2 (Leveraged Firm). In equilibrium,
(a) a firm that is not sufficiently leveraged follows the first best liquidation policy, i.e., `R(q, d) =
`fb(q, d).
(b) a firm that is sufficiently leveraged and operates in a market that is not rapidly shrinking
follows a threshold liquidation policy: `R(q, d) = 1
{
d < dR(q)
}
.
(c) a firm that is sufficiently leveraged and operates in a market that is rapidly shrinking follows
a non-threshold policy: `R(q, d) = 1
{
d ∈ [0, RwM ) ∪ (dR(q), dfb(q))},
where dR(q)
def
=

Rw
M , if M = M˜,
max
(
2sq−Rw
M−2(1−s) ,
Rw
M
)
otherwise.
It is worth noting that a leveraged firm follows the same policy in both the upper and the lower
node of subgame S, i.e., its policy is unaffected by a covenant breach. This is intuitive, since its
17
own policy becomes irrelevant when the breach happens, so that the optimal policy in equilibrium
is the same as when the covenant is not breached.
Lemma 2 is summarized in Figure 5. Note that a firm’s behavior critically depends on whether
it is sufficiently leveraged, and on whether the market is rapidly shrinking or not. As intuition
would dictate, under small enough debt levels, a leveraged firm acts as if the entire order were
funded using its own equity (see Figure 5(a)). However, as leverage increases, the policy starts to
deviate substantially.
dfb
d1
FB
0
LEV
(a)
dR
dfb
d10
LEV
FB
(b)
dR
dfb
d1
wR
M
0
LEV
FB
(c)
Figure 5: Firm’s optimal liquidation policy as a function of realized demand d1. The shaded area denotes a preference
for liquidation at t = 1. The policy above the horizontal axis corresponds to a leveraged firm, when it is (a) not
sufficiently leveraged, or sufficiently leveraged in a market that is (b) not rapidly shrinking or (c) rapidly shrinking.
For comparison, the first best policy is depicted below the axis.
When the market is not rapidly shrinking, a sufficiently leveraged firm still follows a threshold
policy, but starts liquidating less often than first best, see Figure 5(b). In fact, the new threshold
dR(q) is not only lower than dfb(q), but also increases in q at a lower rate, implying that the
discrepancy in policies becomes even more pronounced as leverage increases.
Surprisingly, a sufficiently leveraged firm operating in a rapidly shrinking market entirely de-
parts from threshold policies, see Figure 5(c). To understand this behavior, note that market
conditions in this case are particularly dire, as bleak second period prospects are compounded by
a rapidly depreciating inventory value (s < s2D). At intermediate sales levels
(
wR
M < d < dR(q)
)
,
the latter effect takes precedence, as liquidating (a relatively large) inventory would mean imme-
diate insolvency or extremely low profits for a leveraged firm, while continuing could yield hope of
high(er) profit if the high demand scenario materializes. As before, it is important to note that
a leveraged firm liquidates less often than first best. However, the disagreement here occurs at
intermediate sales levels, where the first best policy liquidates so as to recover a higher total asset
value, while a leveraged firm gambles on continuation. We note that non-threshold policies are not
a by-product of our assumptions, and they persist under considerably more general settings – see
the discussion in Section C.1 of the Appendix.
The critical threshold qD can also be connected with the existence of bankruptcy risk in the
debt agreement, as summarized in the following result.
Lemma 3 (Sufficient leverage and bankruptcy). Under either the first best or the leveraged firm’s
liquidation policy, q > qD is
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(i) a necessary and sufficient condition for bankruptcy risk in non-shrinking markets, and
(ii) a sufficient (but not necessary) condition for bankruptcy risk in shrinking markets.
The result implies that sufficiently leveraged firms always induce bankruptcy risk, and, in fact,
the former phenomenon is actually synonymous with the latter in non-shrinking markets. Since
such markets may be quite natural in practice, this fact bears very relevant implications for our
analysis, suggesting that risky lending agreements of the type examined here are likely to involve
sufficiently leveraged firms, whose liquidation policies depart from first best. Interestingly, this is
not necessarily the case in shrinking markets. Note that the distinction between the two regimes
is given by our earlier definition of shrinking markets (i.e., M ≷ 3), instead of rapidly shrinking
markets (i.e., M ≷ M˜).
4.3 Bank
We next analyze the bank’s optimal liquidation policy in subgame S (see Figure 4(b)).
Lemma 4 (Bank’s liquidation policy). In equilibrium, the bank follows the threshold liquidation
policy `B(q, d1) = 1
{
d1 < dB(q)
}
, unless the collateral value depreciates very rapidly (s < sB) and
the firm is highly leveraged (q > qB), in which case she follows the non-threshold policy `B(q, d1) =
1
{
d1 ∈
[
0, dfb(q)
)∪ (Rw−2qs1−2s , dB(q))}, where qB def= R(M−1+2s)x0cR(M−1+2s)−2Ms , sB def= (M−1)cR2(M−cR) , and dB(q) def=
Rw.
The result suggests that, barring a particular case, the bank follows a threshold liquidation policy,
with a threshold dB(q) that increases in q, R and c, and decreases in x0. It is important to note
that the bank’s own liquidation preferences are also not efficient in general. In particular, it can
be checked that `B(q, d1) ≥ `fb(q, d1), reflecting the bank’s preference for conservative actions that
result in more liquidation than first best.
Interestingly, the bank also departs from a threshold policy, under similar conditions as the firm,
i.e., low liquidation value and high leverage. Here, when the realized sales are low (d1 <
Rw−2qs
1−2s ),
it can be checked that the firm is bankrupt, and the bank is set to seize all its assets, either at
t = 1 or at t = 2. As such, the bank effectively becomes the owner and operator of the inventory,
and prefers to follow the first best policy, liquidating below the threshold dfb(q), and continuing
otherwise.
While in this paper we assumed perfect and symmetric information, it is nonetheless interesting
to briefly consider a setting where the bank is unable to directly observe the firm’s first period
sales. In such a case, when optimal, the bank’s non-threshold liquidation policy might induce a
firm with sales above Rw−2qs1−2s , but below dB, to underreport the sales, so as to avoid liquidation.
9
9It can be checked that such a firm would prefer continuation to liquidation, and may thus choose to report sales
strictly below Rw−2qs
1−2s , but above d
fb.
19
This effect has already been documented in the context of debt-service renegotiation, where a
borrower in default may overstate their debt service abatement in order to obtain better terms
from the lender. Specifically, Bourgeon and Dionne (2013) find that asymmetric information about
liquidation value might induce firms with high values to act as firms with lower values. In our case,
sales underreporting would not be driven only by information asymmetry, but also by the players’
operational preferences. Similar to Bourgeon and Dionne (2013), our model also suggests that this
behavior would be more likely in markets where liquidation values are low and leverage is high.
4.4 Liquidation Conflict
To understand how tension between the players may arise, we now compare their optimal liquidation
policies, and identify the circumstances under which they are in (dis)agreement. To this end, note
that the firm would never prefer liquidating its inventory if this action lead to insolvency. As such,
whenever the firm prefers liquidation, the bank is always made whole, and the two players are in
agreement. When the firm prefers to continue, however, it is possible that the bank might prefer
liquidation. This prompts us to introduce the following definition.
Definition 4. We define the disagreement region D as the set of first period demand realizations
for which the liquidation preferences of the two players are misaligned. More formally,
D def=
{
d ≥ 0 | XR,L (q, d) < E[XR,C (q, d,D2)|D1 = d ] andXB,L (q, d) > E[XB,C (q, d,D2)|D1 = d ]
}
.
Whenever D 6= ∅, we say that liquidation conflict exists between the two players.
Liquidation conflict here is a direct manifestation of agency issues,10 driven by the shareholder-
debtholder conflict of interest (Jensen and Meckling 1976, Myers 1977, Smith and Warner 1979).
Intuitively, by continuing, the firm (shareholder) has limited downside and potentially large upside,
due to its leverage. It is thus effectively shifting risk to the bank (debtholder). On the contrary,
the bank may prefer liquidation, so as not to expose the collateral to further potential depreciation.
Note that the existence and the extent of liquidation conflict critically depend on the firm’s order
quantity q and market parameters. To this end, our next result precisely characterizes the disagree-
ment region, showing that it is always a (possibly empty) interval of demand values, intrinsically
related to whether a firm is sufficiently leveraged.
Lemma 5 (Liquidation conflict). In equilibrium, liquidation conflict arises if and only if the firm
10We note that agency issues may exist between the two players in other forms, as well, e.g., concerning the choice
of initial order quantity q (see, e.g., Buzacott and Zhang 2004). We use the term “liquidation conflict” to completely
isolate the effect, and pinpoint that it is related to dynamic inventory decisions, i.e., liquidation policies.
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is sufficiently leveraged. More precisely,
D =
∅, if q ≤ qD,(d(q), d(q)), otherwise, where
d(q)
def
=
max
(
dR(q), Rw−2sq1−2s
)
ifM ≥ M˜,
max
(
Rw
M ,
Rw−2sq
1−2s
)
otherwise,
and d(q)
def
=
dB(q) ifM ≥ M˜,min (dB(q), dR(q)) otherwise.
Moreover, d(q)− d(q) is increasing in q.
The result shows that the two players are in complete agreement, i.e., D = ∅, when the firm is
not sufficiently leveraged. Otherwise, liquidation conflict always arises, at intermediate levels of
sales,
(
d(q), d(q)
)
. This is quite intuitive, since for low (high) enough sales, both players agree that
the optimal action is to liquidate (continue). Furthermore, there is increasing conflict as leverage
increases, and, ceteris paribus, conflict is more likely as the market strength M , the interest rate
R or the per-unit cost c increase, or as the firm’s initial capital x0 decreases.
In view of our earlier results, liquidation conflict arises exactly when leveraged firms deviate
from first best. More interestingly, note that while liquidation conflict always arises in the presence
of bankruptcy risk in non-shrinking markets, that is not necessarily the case if the market is
shrinking: strictly higher leverage may be required to generate liquidation conflict, than to result
in bankruptcy risk (see Lemma 3).
5 Flexibility-driven Agency Costs and Covenant Effectiveness
The liquidation conflict identified above could potentially give rise to agency costs. To formalize
this, consider a firm desiring to follow the first best actions, and thus order qfb. Since a debt contract
signed at t = 0 cannot explicitly bind the firm to follow a particular operational policy at t = 1,11
once the debt is in place, the (now leveraged) firm would actually follow the liquidation policy `R
in equilibrium, which generally differs from the first best policy `fb, as discussed in Lemma 2. By
rationally anticipating this risk shifting behavior at t = 1, the bank would charge a higher interest
rate, generating financing costs that could be large enough to induce the firm to reduce its initial
debt burden and order quantity. This could lead to a value loss, with the firm’s expected profits
being lower than the maximum possible value of V fb.
Liquidation conflict and its associated agency costs shed light on why covenants may be useful.
When there is disagreement concerning the liquidation decision, an appropriately crafted covenant
11This is consistent with typical assumptions in the literature on incomplete contracts (see, e.g., Aghion and
Bolton 1992, Hart and Moore 1998), as well as with observed practice. Contracts that seek to prescribe actions or
payments for every possible contingency would be overly complex, and would also not be enforceable ex-post in a
court (Gaˆrleanu and Zwiebel 2009, Hilson 2013, Tirole 2006).
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would offer the lender protection through the transfer of control rights. To see this, note that when
the firm’s order quantity q results in liquidation conflict, i.e., D 6= ∅, the inclusion of a financial
covenant with a cash flow threshold δ ∈ D would give the bank the right to force liquidation at
t = 1 whenever d1 ∈ (d(q), δ), an action that would be optimal for her, but not for the firm. This
added protection would enable the bank to lower the interest rate, and thus the agency costs of
debt could be reduced. Would overly tight covenants, warranting ever decreasing interest rates,
then fully alleviate agency costs? The answer is clearly no, as in that case the bank’s liquidation
preferences would be enforced, which we have also argued to be inefficient (Section 4.3).
This leads to the central question addressed in our paper: How effective are simple covenants
in mitigating agency costs, i.e., how much value can they restore?
Theoretically, state-contingent control transfer mechanisms such as covenants could conceivably
fully alleviate agency costs as long as they ensure that, in any state of the world, control rights
lie with a player who prefers to follow the first best action in that particular state. In our setting,
it is entirely unclear whether such a mechanism is possible, particularly when limiting attention
to the simple (financial or borrowing base) covenants encountered in practice. Worse, the players’
non-threshold policies might further undermine the effectiveness of such simple covenants.
To study these issues, we now formally define the agency costs of debt. To simplify contract
notation, we omit the interest rate R, as it is always determined endogenously as a function of all
other parameters and decisions, so that the bank breaks even.
For a contract κ, let VR(κ) denote the maximum expected profit achievable by the firm, i.e.,
VR(κ)
def
= maximize piR(q, κ)
subject to q ≥ 0
piB(q, κ) = 0.
(3)
The associated agency costs correspond to the relative value loss compared with the optimal ex-
tracted value under the first best actions, i.e.,
A(κ)
def
=
V fb − VR(κ)
V fb
. (4)
In equilibrium, when contracts are optimally chosen from a particular set K ∈ {K∅,KF,KB}, the
resulting agency costs are given by infκ∈KA(κ). The lower the equilibrium agency costs are, the
more effective the set of contracts K is in alleviating agency issues.
In the remainder of the analysis, let q? and `? denote the equilibrium quantity and liquidation
policy, respectively.
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5.1 Interest-Rate-Only Contracts
The following result confirms that interest-rate-only contracts generally fail to alleviate agency
issues, and lead to an equilibrium where firms with low capital under-order relative to first best.
Theorem 1. Under interest-rate-only contracts,
(i) if x0 ≥ x˜0, infκ∈K∅ A(κ) = 0. In particular, there are no agency costs, q? = qfb, and `? = `fb.
(ii) if x0 < x˜0, infκ∈K∅ A(κ) > 0. In particular, agency costs persist, q
? < qfb, and `? = `R ≤ `fb.
Here, x˜0 is a threshold that is strictly lower than c q
fb and depends only on the market param-
eters M , c, s, and F1 (for an explicit characterization, see the proof of the theorem). The result
confirms that, under interest-rate-only contracts, firms with low initial capital will always be faced
with agency costs, as their high leverage coupled with the inability to relinquish control rights will
always make them “too risky” for the lender. Put differently, such firms will always be unable to
harness the full benefits afforded by the flexibility of an intermediate liquidation option, because
lenders will fear that this flexibility could be used to shift risk.
5.2 Contracts With Covenants
Surprisingly, despite the complexity of the setting, a contract with a financial covenant is able
to completely alleviate agency costs and ensure that first best actions are always followed, in
equilibrium.
Theorem 2. Under contracts that include financial covenants,
inf
κ∈KF
A(κ) = 0, ∀x0 ≥ 0.
In particular, there are no agency costs, and q? = qfb, `? = `fb.
This result critically highlights the effectiveness of simple financial covenants at dealing with
agency issues that arise from dynamic inventory liquidation decisions. Financial covenants enable
firms to maximally exploit the potential of a business opportunity, irrespective of their initial
capital. In conjunction with Theorem 1, this result also implies that covenants are particularly
effective for firms with limited initial capital; this is in line with the empirical results in Bradley
and Roberts (2004), who find firms that are smaller or have fewer tangible assets to face more
covenants in their debt agreements.
A direct corollary of Theorem 2 is that borrowing base covenants, which subsume financial
covenants, KB ⊃ KF, also fully alleviate agency costs. More generally, covenants tied to the firm’s
cash flow appear to adequately reflect the operating flexibility provided by a liquidation option,
and are thus able to fully restore firm value. In the face of additional operating flexibility, e.g.,
through partial liquidations or replenishments (see Section 6), this will no longer be true.
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5.3 Optimal Covenant Design and Bankruptcy Risk
Our analysis also allows characterizing the optimal covenant term in equilibrium, highlighting its
dependence on market parameters.
Theorem 3. In equilibrium, the covenant cash flow threshold is given by δ? = 2sq
fb
M+2s−1 . Moreover,
δ? is increasing in s and D1 in the usual stochastic order, and decreasing in c.
The comparative statics in Theorem 3 might initially seem surprising. Ceteris paribus, one
might expect markets with lower inventory depreciation rates (i.e., larger s), lower production
costs (i.e., lower c) or stronger demand (i.e., higher D1) to be more secure, and to thus warrant less
protection, in the form of less tight covenants. However, these conditions also lead to larger first
best order quantities, and hence larger debt levels and increased “risk.” We note that δ? has a non-
monotonic behavior in M . Intuitively, higher M also induces a larger debt through a larger order,
but this is primarily due to an increased second period cash flow. As such, it is unclear whether
increasing the first period required cash flow, i.e., δ?, would result in better risk protection.12
Finally, our analysis enables the characterization of precise conditions under which covenants
are necessary, connecting these with bankruptcy risk and the firm’s initial capital.
Theorem 4. In equilibrium, a covenant is necessarily included if and only if the firm’s initial
capital x0 is below the threshold x˜0. Furthermore, bankruptcy risk is:
(i) a necessary and sufficient condition for covenants to be included in a non-shrinking market,
(ii) a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for covenants to be included in a shrinking market.
Covenants are tantamount to bankruptcy risk in non-shrinking markets. Given that, in practice,
bankruptcy risk persists in a vast majority of debt agreements, this suggests that covenants should
also be ubiquitous. This is consistent with empirical findings: Bradley and Roberts (2004) find
a positive relation between the inclusion of covenants and bankruptcy risk (as measured through
credit spreads), and Roberts and Sufi (2009b) find that 97% of all loans contain at least one financial
covenant. It is also aligned with insights in the finance literature, which often informally equate13
the presence of covenants to bankruptcy risk (Myers 1977). In addition, our result also highlights a
distinction between bankruptcy and covenants in shrinking markets, where risky debt agreements
without covenants may be possible. To the best of our knowledge, this insight is new, and is
afforded exclusively by the more detailed operational model.
12It can be shown that δ? is decreasing in M when D1 is uniformly distributed. Our numerical simulations also
suggest that this is the case for a Gaussian or exponential distribution.
13For instance, in a summary of his insights, Myers (1977) states that “[...] a firm with risky debt outstanding, and
which acts in its stockholders’ interest, will follow a different decision rule than one which can issue risk-free debt or
which issues no debt at all.”
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6 Additional Flexibility: Partial Liquidation and Replenishment
We investigate the impact of additional inventory management flexibility on the effectiveness and
design of covenants, and on the players’ equilibrium actions. We study the following two extensions.
First, the model we considered so far allowed the two players a choice between continuation
and full liquidation at t = 1. In practice, operators may have additional flexibility, and be able to
conduct partial liquidations, e.g., by performing temporary promotional or clearance sales (Talluri
and Van Ryzin 2004), or by closing down only a number of underperforming stores. Similarly, upon
a covenant violation and the transfer of control rights, lenders may force firms to only partially
liquidate, thereby increasing cash holdings and being able to continue with a leaner business.
Second, our model offered a single opportunity of ordering inventory, at t = 0. In practical
settings where lead times are not excessively long compared to the selling season, operators may
have the flexibility to respond to strong sales by replenishing their stock.
We capture these realistic features by gradually enhancing the operator’s flexibility, first allowing
partial liquidation (Section 6.1) and then adding a replenishment option (Section 6.2). We further
enrich the model by extending the two-point distribution for the second period demand to a general
distribution, while preserving the correlation structure assumed thus far. Specifically, we relax
Assumptions 1 and 2, replacing them with
Assumption 3. The random variable Z that drives second period demand has non-negative sup-
port, with c.d.f. FZ and p.d.f. fZ .
We also implicitly assume second period demand to be unaffected by the firm’s inventory adjust-
ment,14 and retain all other assumptions and notation employed so far.
6.1 Partial Liquidation
When partial liquidation is possible, the main changes in the game between the two players occur
in the subgame S at the intermediate period. All definitions, such as first best actions and agency
costs of debt, extend naturally to this setting. For conciseness, we describe only the sequence of
actions and the outcome in the new subgame S.
At t = 1, the firm moves first, by observing the first period demand d1, and deciding what
fraction ` ∈ [0, 1] of the leftover inventory to liquidate. For example, under the firm’s action,
` · (q − d1)+ units would be liquidated, resulting in an additional cash flow of s · ` · (q − d1)+, and
a starting inventory level of (1− `) · (q − d1)+ for the second selling period.
In case the loan contract includes a covenant, the bank moves second, and evaluates the covenant
terms using the firm’s cash flow min(q, d1)+s ·` ·(q−d1)+ and remaining inventory (1−`) ·(q−d1)+
14For instance, this assumption would apply when liquidating geographically segregated stores or units of the same
business, or returning products to the manufacturer at less than the wholesale price. For other examples, see Talluri
and Van Ryzin (2004).
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after the firm’s actions. Upon a covenant breach, the bank gains control, and decides whether and
how much additional inventory should be liquidated. The outcome of the subgame is the total
fraction of inventory that was liquidated as a result of actions by both players.
We start our analysis with a comparison of the player’s liquidation preferences that highlights
the resulting agency conflict. Let `P : R × R → [0, 1] denote the optimal standalone policy for
player P ∈ {R,B}, in case the player were solely responsible for taking liquidation actions.
Lemma 6 (Standalone liquidation policies). The players’ optimal standalone policies at t = 1, in
case they were solely responsible for the liquidation actions, are such that `B(q, d) ≥ `R(q, d) for all
q and d. Agency conflict arises, i.e., `B(q, d) > `R(q, d), if d < dS
def
= Rw−sq1−s .
Comparing the players’ standalone policies yields similar qualitative insights as our earlier
analysis. In particular, the firm prefers to carry a higher stock into the second period—shifting
risk—while the bank prefers lower stock so as not to expose the collateral to further potential de-
preciation. Conflict arises under poor first period demand, which results in large leftover inventory.
In fact, when d1 < dS, the firm is insolvent at t = 1, i.e., the cash flow d1 + s(q − d1) obtained by
liquidating all remaining inventory would be lower than its liabilities Rw.
Critically different from our earlier setup, however, is the fact that—in anticipation of the
additional liquidation forced by the bank—the firm might now use its operating flexibility to affect
and possibly avert a covenant violation, by boosting its cash flow at t = 1 through its liquidation
actions. Let `?R denote the firm’s equilibrium liquidation policy.
Lemma 7. In equilibrium, a financial covenant is never violated if the firm is solvent at t = 1.
More precisely, `?R(q, d) ≥ `C(q, d) ∀d ≥ dS, where `C(q, d) def= min
{
z ≥ 0 | d + s(q − d)+z ≥ δ} is
the minimum required liquidation so that the firm’s cash flow at t = 1 exactly covers the covenant.
The result has two key implications. First, it confirms that, in equilibrium, a leveraged firm that is
solvent but is faced with a covenant violation would always liquidate enough inventory to cover the
covenant, allowing it to retain full control rights. This complements the debt-covenant hypothesis
developed in the empirical accounting literature—which argues that managers pull accounting levers
to avoid a costly covenant breach—by showing how managers can also pull operational levers to
achieve the same result. This provides an alternative explanation for the empirical findings in
Dichev and Skinner (2002), who document that an unusually large number of firms have financial
metrics that are right at the covenant breach level. Furthermore, the policy predicted by our model
is surprisingly well aligned with the actions taken by L.A. Gear’s management in the aftermath
of its sale to Trefoil Capital Investment L.P., as alluded to in the quote in the Introduction (see
DeAngelo et al. 2002 for more details). The result also confirms and extends the intuition in Besbes
and Maglaras (2012), who study non-leveraged and non-strategic firms faced with (exogenous)
financial milestones, by arguing that, when feasible, it is optimal for leveraged, strategic firms to
conduct fire sales in order to exactly meet a financial covenant.
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The second key implication of Lemma 7 is that financial covenants may not be effective in such
settings. In particular, when the firm liquidates exactly so as to avert a covenant violation, less
inventory is typically liquidated than what the lender would have preferred. Thus, agency conflict
persists, and financial covenants are no longer able to restore full firm value for sufficiently leveraged
firms, as formalized in the next result.
Theorem 5. Under contracts that include financial covenants,
inf
κ∈KF
A(κ) > 0, if x0 < x¯0. (5)
The threshold x¯0 depends on market parameters M , c, s, F1 and FZ—see the proof of the Theorem
for a characterization. To provide more intuition for their failure, note that financial covenants, by
exclusively relying on cash flow, are agnostic to the firm’s liquidation actions, and thus cannot dis-
tinguish “healthy sales” at full price from “fire sales.” This suggests that covenants with additional
“degrees of freedom”—reflective of the firm’s own increased operating flexibility—are needed. To
this end, we next assess the effectiveness of borrowing base covenants.
Theorem 6. Under contracts that include borrowing base covenants,
inf
κ∈KB
A(κ) = 0, ∀x0 ≥ 0. (6)
The equilibrium borrowing base covenant sets an inventory advance rate of α? = 1− 2(1−s)
s(M−1)F−1Z (1−s)
,
and a threshold β? = sqfb.15 Moreover, α? is increasing in M and Z in the usual stochastic order;
β? is increasing in s, decreasing in c, increasing in M , and increasing in D1 and Z in the usual
stochastic order.
This result bears two important implications. First, it highlights the effectiveness of borrowing
base covenants when dealing with inventory-heavy firms. By applying a suitable advance rate to
the remaining inventory and optimally setting the minimum required borrowing base level, such
covenants are able to fully mitigate the agency conflict generated by the additional operating
flexibility and completely restore firm value. As an aside, since borrowing base covenants are
primarily used in secured loans (Hilson 2013, Roberts and Sufi 2009a), this result also provides
additional justification for inventory-heavy firms to collateralize their assets.
Second, our result suggests that advance rates against inventory collateral are critical contract
terms, which should be set to properly reflect future risk: the comparative statics of α? suggest that
stronger residual demand warrants less aggressive “hair cuts.”16 The comparative statics concerning
15As a technical remark, if 1− 2(1−s)
s(M−1)F−1
Z
(1−s) < 0, then α
? = 0 and β? = sqfb − s(1− 2(1−s)
s(M−1)F−1
Z
(1−s)
)
(qfb − d1).
16It can be shown that α? is increasing in s when Z is uniformly distributed. Our numerical simulations also
suggest that this is the case for a Gaussian or exponential distribution.
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β? are consistent with our earlier findings in Section 5.3, confirming that lenders enforce tighter
covenants in the face of more secure markets.
Together with Theorem 5, these findings provide a theoretical rationale for several practices
and informal beliefs of banks lending against inventory. While borrowing base covenants and their
associated advance rates are routinely used in that context,17 typical contracts often include fewer
financial covenants, reflective of the practitioners’ view concerning their questionable effectiveness:
“[...] facilities are typically underwritten with a limited number of financial covenants;
the additional risk this poses to the bank is mitigated by conservative advance rates
against liquid collateral, strong collateral controls, and frequent monitoring.[...] Some
banks institute financial covenants to monitor retail borrowers, but the usefulness of
financial covenants is debatable, given (1) the overwhelming reliance on collateral liq-
uidity to repay the debt and (2) a firm’s tendency to experience seasonal losses. Excess
availability covenants, however, can help ensure an adequate collateral cushion in the
event of liquidation and provide current and meaningful measures of liquidity; [...]”
(Comptroller of the Currency, U.S. Treasury Department CH 2014)
Our results are also consistent with the empirical findings in Flannery and Wang (2011),
who document that secured loans that include borrowing base covenants involve fewer financial
covenants, and are particularly pertinent for smaller or riskier firms. This is the only paper we are
aware of in the empirical finance literature that examines borrowing-based lines of credit.
6.2 Partial Liquidation and Replenishment
We now consider the case in which both partial liquidation and replenishment are possible. That
is, the firm now also has the ability to place an additional order at t = 1 at per-unit cost c. We
model two ways the firm could finance such an order: either by borrowing more money or by
using cash it generated from first-period sales. To enable the latter, we relax the lockbox account’s
zero withdrawal limit assumption, as per term [T2], and append the following term to any of the
contracts we consider:
[T2]′ The firm is allowed to withdraw cash from the lockbox account at t = 1 up to a limit η,
provided it is solely used to order additional inventory that is added to the collateral base.
For simplicity, we retain our earlier notation for the various sets of contracts, e.g., KB denotes
contracts with borrowing base covenants (and term [T2]′ included).
In the new subgame, the firm observes the first period demand and decides whether it would
prefer to perform a partial liquidation—as outlined in the previous section—or to replenish its
17Roberts and Sufi (2009a) study both collateralized and non-collateralized loans, and document that 20% of
the contracts include borrowing base contingencies, with 98% of these calculated based on accounts receivable and
inventory, as in our model.
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inventory. The bank evaluates the covenant terms (if existent) using the firm’s remaining cash and
inventory after its actions. If breached, the bank gains control and decides whether and by how
much the inventory position should be further adjusted, either through liquidation or replenishment.
In case the firm wishes to borrow more money for replenishment, the bank extends the extra funds
needed and charges an interest rate so that the (new) loan remains competitively priced.
The ability to replenish inventory endows the firm with considerable flexibility to respond
to favorable market conditions. However, this may also act as an additional risk shifting lever,
exacerbating agency conflict with the lender due to the firm’s tendency to over-order once it is
leveraged (see, e.g., Buzacott and Zhang 2004). Fortunately, a contract with a borrowing base
covenant and a non-zero withdrawal limit is again able to fully alleviate agency issues and restore
optimality, as formalized in our next result.
Theorem 7. Under contracts that include borrowing base covenants,
inf
κ∈KB
A(κ) = 0, ∀x0 ≥ 0. (7)
In equilibrium, the borrowing base covenant sets an inventory advance rate of α? = 1− 2(1−s)
s(M−1)F−1Z (1−s)
,
and a threshold β? = sqfb. The withdrawal limit from the lockbox account is η? = φb− cqfb, where
b
def
= min(q, d1) is the account balance, and φ = c
(
1 +
(M−1)F−1Z (1−c)
2
)
.
The theorem reaffirms the efficiency of borrowing base covenants when dealing with inventory-
heavy firms. Despite the considerably more complex setting, such a covenant—coupled with a
suitable withdrawal limit—is able to complete the financial contract, and fully restore firm value.
It is worth noting that the advance rate α? and the minimum threshold β? are actually identical to
those derived in Section 6.1, suggesting that the primary role of the covenant is to alleviate agency
issues resulting from inefficient partial liquidation. In contrast, the withdrawal limit completely
mitigates conflict arising from inefficient investments, by preventing the firm from over-ordering.
As a technical remark, we note that maintaining a zero withdrawal limit and relying only on bor-
rowing more money for reordering would have achieved the same purpose here. However, reordering
with generated cash subject to a withdrawal limit is also natural: it is consistent with practice,
and with our earlier assumption concerning the role of the lockbox in limiting cash diversion (and
the associated agency conflict). Furthermore, allowing the withdrawal limit to depend on the cash
balance is also very natural. In practice, such limits are often imposed through reinvestment or
incurrence-based covenants, i.e., covenants that become active only when the borrower seeks to
issue new debt, and limit the new loan size depending on the pre-existing debt and cash funds (see,
e.g., Nini et al. (2009) and industry notes by Goodison (2011) and Morse (2014) for more details).
It is worth noting that η does not have a precise monotonicity in any of the parameters, reflective
of the ambivalent effects at play. For instance, a larger M warrants larger investments (and hence
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a larger withdrawal limit), but also reflects higher bankruptcy risk due to the larger leverage.
In summary, our findings in Section 6 send a clear and concrete message to inventory-heavy
firms and lenders alike. First, our results suggest that a cash-poor firm that is contemplating
operational changes to enhance its flexibility (such as the ability to liquidate some of its inventory
or a reduction in lead time to allow mid-season replenishments) should not hesitate to enter debt-
financing agreements of the type commonly employed in practice. When suitably designed, such
agreements would allow the firm to reap the full benefits of the extra flexibility, irrespective of its
actual leverage. However, the firm should also be willing to cede more control as the investments it
is contemplating yield more flexibility or upside, by, e.g., collateralizing its inventory and abiding by
more and/or tighter covenants. For lenders, our results confirm that secured loans may be extremely
effective for inventory-heavy firms, and that financial contracts underpinning such transactions are
better served by borrowing base covenants rather than (cash-flow-based) financial covenants.
7 Implications and Limitations
In this paper, we highlighted that a firm’s flexible operating capabilities can have unintended
consequences on its performance, due to the large agency costs induced under leverage through
the risk shifting potential. Given the indispensable role of both flexibility and debt in driving the
growth strategies of firms, we believe this is a topic of utmost importance that has received very
limited attention in the operations management (OM) literature. In particular, while OM research
has developed many insights concerning the benefits of flexibility, the magnitude of the associated
agency costs and the ability of common terms included in debt contracts to alleviate them are not
well understood.
The goal of the present paper was to make headway in this direction. We took the perspective
of an inventory-heavy firm (e.g., a firm or a manufacturer), and demonstrated that flexibility in
adjusting inventory levels could result in agency costs that erase significant firm value when debt
contracts only include competitively-priced interest rates. The inclusion of properly structured
financial or borrowing base covenants, routinely used in practice, proved to be remarkably effective
at addressing these agency issues and restoring firm value.
Our core findings give rise to a series of managerial implications and empirical predictions,
which we outline next, followed by a discussion of our work’s limitations.
7.1 Managerial Implications
Our work sheds light on a new dimension managers should consider when investing in increased
flexibility. While traditional wisdom suggests that the manager should trade off the technol-
ogy/infrastructure upgrade costs with the operational benefits of extra flexibility, this view ignores
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that flexibility could result in increased borrowing costs and/or reduced debt capacity. This lat-
ter component of the tradeoff calculation can be of substantial magnitude, and eventually be the
decisive factor driving the firm’s operating strategy.
In the context of inventory adjustment flexibility, we argue that borrowing costs should not
increase in practice, as simple covenants are effective in alleviating the associated agency issues.
These findings send a clear and concrete message to an inventory-heavy firm that contemplates
operational changes to enhance flexibility, such as lead time reduction to allow for a mid-season
replenishment or the addition of separate sales channels to allow for (partial) inventory liquidation.
Such a firm should not hesitate to finance its operations through debt: by suitably structuring its
debt contracts, it can reap the full benefits of the extra flexibility, irrespective of leverage.
To this end, our results show that it is in the firm’s best interest to ensure that the design
of debt contracts (and covenants) always adequately reflects its operating capabilities and mar-
ket conditions. Specifically, for inventory-heavy firms, we find that financial covenants reflect full
liquidation decisions (such as store closures or product discontinuations), while borrowing base
covenants are needed for partial liquidations and/or replenishment capabilities. Furthermore, we
show that covenants must be tighter under lower inventory depreciation rates, higher margins, or
stronger product demand. These findings have several core implications. First, they suggest that
firms with enhanced flexibility and/or operating in better markets should abide by more intense
and/or tight covenants. This may seem counterintuitive to an operator, as (i) the better markets
may seem more “secure,” and (ii) the covenants could restrict the firm’s operating flexibility. Sec-
ond, they suggest that suitably designed covenants would also allow operators to focus on their
core competency, i.e., running the firm’s operations without concern of the capital structure.
Our work also has several implications for circumstances under which financial frictions persist—
e.g., due to improperly designed contracts or monopolistic lending markets—where we show that
distortions may arise in both operating policies and information disclosure incentives. Specifically,
we argue that both the firm’s managers and its creditors may follow non-intuitive operating poli-
cies, concerning the discontinuation of product lines or store closures, that are not driven by simple
sales thresholds: they may prefer continuation for weak sales, and discontinuation for strong sales.
Furthermore, managers may also prefer to distort information disclosures, by under-reporting the
firm’s sales in order to avert creditor-imposed store closures. Finally, we also argue that monopo-
listic lenders use covenants so as to improve their returns and lower bankruptcy risk, exacerbating
operating distortions and leading to loss in firm value.
7.2 Empirical Predictions
Our results lead to several predictions that can be tested empirically, which we discuss next.
Prediction 1. Inventory-heavy firms with more operating flexibility have higher leverage and issue
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more bank debt.
In the finance literature, it is known that operating flexibility can have ambivalent effects on
a firm’s borrowing costs, decreasing them—when the ability to adapt to market conditions is used
to lower the risk of default (Mauer and Triantis 1994)—but also possibly increasing them, when
lenders believe the extra flexibility is used to shift risk (Myers 1977). In this context, MacKay
(2003) is the first paper to empirically examine which of the two effects is the dominant one,
concluding that it is the latter, so that firms with more production flexibility generally have lower
leverage, and issue less public debt. The implicit factor driving this result is that covenants or
other risk shifting mitigating mechanisms employed in practice do not prove effective. Our results
nuance and partially counter this prediction, while confirming more bank debt issuance. More
precisely, for inventory-heavy firms, Theorems 2, 6, and 7 suggest that simple financial contracts
(with covenants) can completely mitigate the risk shifting behavior, leaving only the positive aspect
of extra flexibility, and thus leading to larger leverage. At the same time, these results also show
that borrowing base covenants may become critical as operating flexibility increases, suggesting
that such firms are more likely to raise bank debt, which allows for asset collateralization and more
proactive monitoring by lenders. This also leads to the following associated prediction.
Prediction 2. For inventory-heavy firms, increased operating flexibility is positively related to (a)
the presence of borrowing base covenants (and collateralization), and (b) covenant intensity.
To the best of our knowledge, these predictions have not been previously formalized, and are
afforded by the more detailed operational model of an inventory-heavy firm. For a more detailed dis-
cussion and justification, we refer to Section 6.2. Our analytical results in Lemma 7 and Theorem 5
also suggest that inventory-heavy firms will use the partial inventory liquidation flexibility to avert
violations of financial (cash-flow-based) covenants, leading to the following empirical prediction.
Prediction 3. Inventory-heavy firms with increased operating flexibility that are only faced with
financial (cash-flow-based) covenants will tend to (a) engage in fire-sales and liquidations close to
reporting periods, and (b) report covenant ratios near the trigger points.
This is aligned with the empirical findings in Dichev and Skinner (2002), who document that
an unusually large number of firms have financial metrics that are right at the covenant breach
level, and also with the actions documented in the empirical case study on L.A. Gear (DeAngelo
et al. 2002). In a different (but related) sense, Theorems 5, 6, and 7 also suggest that for firms
with increased inventory-management flexibility, financial covenants may be of limited use, but
borrowing base covenants may be very effective. This is consistent with practice (CH 2014, Hilson
2013), and also with empirical findings in Flannery and Wang (2011), who document that secured
lending agreements that include borrowing base covenants involve fewer financial covenants, and
are particularly pertinent for smaller or riskier firms.
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Our comparative statics analysis also generates several predictions concerning the covenant
tightness, and its dependency on the firm’s operating characteristics and market conditions. More
precisely, Theorems 1, 3, 5, 6, and 7 generate the following prediction.
Prediction 4. Inventory-heavy firms will be faced with tighter covenants when they have (a) fewer
assets or (b) higher leverage, or when they operate in markets with (c) lower inventory depreciation
rates, (d) higher margins or (e) stronger demands.
To the best of our knowledge, while the empirical literature has focused extensively on (the de-
terminants of) covenant intensity, it has paid less attention to their tightness, and its dependence
on firm/market characteristics.18 Demiroglu and James (2010) find a positive relationship between
covenant tightness and (a) the riskiness of the borrowers, and (b) improvements in the covenant
variable. This is consistent with our prediction that better market conditions—which are typi-
cally positively related to improvements in the covenant variable—also warrant tighter covenants.
To the extent that covenant intensity is positively related to tightness, our predictions are also
very well aligned with Bradley and Roberts (2004) and Billett et al. (2007), who document that
firms that are smaller, have fewer tangible assets, or have greater growth opportunities face more
covenants. Furthermore, Billett et al. (2007) find that the presence of covenants significantly atten-
uates the negative relation between leverage and growth opportunities, consistent with our results
that covenants are effective in alleviating agency costs of debt for high-growth firms.
Finally, the results in Theorem 4 and 8 also lead to the following prediction.
Prediction 5. In less competitive lending markets, inventory-heavy firms face more intense covenants,
and have less financial leverage.
To the best of our knowledge, this has not been previously hypothesized, as the finance literature
is predominantly focused on competitive lending markets.
7.3 Limitations and Future Directions
In modeling flexibility-driven agency costs, we made a specific choice of operating capability, i.e.,
inventory liquidation and replenishment. In reality, there are several other capabilities one could
model, such as sourcing from multiple suppliers, switching between different products, dynamic
pricing, etc. The effectiveness of common covenants in alleviating agency issues in these alternate
settings is an open question, and in our view is an interesting new line of research for the operations
management community.
In the context of inventory flexibility, it may also be interesting to extend our model to an
arbitrary number of periods. While our intuition is that the qualitative insights we obtained will
18The most relevant paper we are aware of that studies tightness is Demiroglu and James (2010), who state
that “where covenant thresholds are established is an important but heretofore largely overlooked aspect of loan
contracting.”
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persist if the covenant monitoring points coincide with the firm’s decisions points, these results
may change in the absence of adequate monitoring frequency. Furthermore, a multi-period setting
would allow studying other interesting questions pertaining to the firm’s financial structure and its
interplay with operations. For instance, while it is known that the choice of debt maturity may act
as a substitute for covenants in other settings (Billett et al. 2007), it is unclear whether that would
persist for inventory-heavy firms.
Lastly, our study focused on the design of contracts that fully alleviated agency costs. An
interesting direction of future research is to quantify agency costs in case such contracts are not
used. Preliminary numerical studies for the case where interest-rate-only (financial-covenant only)
contracts are used for the flexvendor (with re-ordering) are included in Section A of the Appendix.
The studies suggest that (1) flexibility-driven agency costs have a first order effect on firm value
in the absence of covenants, and (2) covenants that are not fully aligned with the firm’s operating
flexibility are effective in mitigating agency costs, although the persisting costs are still non-trivial.
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Appendices
A Agency Costs Under Suboptimal Contracts: Numerical Studies
We study cases where contracts that are unable to fully alleviate agency costs are used and nu-
merically assess their effectiveness. We rely on the flexvendor model introduced in Section 2 and
extend the numerical experiments as follows. We vary the flexvendor’s unit cost c, the liquidation
value s and equity x0. All other model parameters retain their values. Tables 3 and 4 report the
agency costs (1) in the absence of a covenant, formally inf
κ∈K∅
A(κ), and (2) when only a financial
covenant is used, formally inf
κ∈KF
A(κ).
The findings suggest that, in the absence of covenants, flexibility-driven agency costs average
at 12.52%, while they can be as high as 41.9% (see Table 4). The inclusion of a financial covenant
reduces agency costs to an average of 2.74%, while persisting costs could be as high as 13%.
AC without covenant AC with financial covenant
inf
κ∈K∅
A(κ) (in %) inf
κ∈KF
A(κ) (in %)
min 0.00 0.00
average 12.52 2.74
max 41.93 12.99
Table 3: Minimum, average and maximum agency costs (AC) across all runs from Table 4.
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unit cost liq. price equity AC without cov. AC with fin. cov.
c s x0 inf
κ∈K∅
A(κ) (in %) inf
κ∈KF
A(κ) (in %)
0.2 0.1 0.1 0.62 0.00
0.2 0.1 0.2 0.49 0.07
0.2 0.1 0.4 0.24 0.00
0.2 0.1 0.8 0.00 0.00
0.4 0.1 0.1 6.73 0.96
0.4 0.1 0.2 6.20 0.62
0.4 0.1 0.4 5.52 0.52
0.4 0.1 0.8 3.64 0.38
0.4 0.3 0.1 1.47 0.22
0.4 0.3 0.2 0.71 0.00
0.4 0.3 0.4 0.65 0.22
0.4 0.3 0.8 0.00 0.00
0.6 0.1 0.1 22.63 5.73
0.6 0.1 0.2 21.15 4.59
0.6 0.1 0.4 18.28 3.41
0.6 0.1 0.8 13.52 1.93
0.6 0.3 0.1 14.23 2.98
0.6 0.3 0.2 12.70 2.84
0.6 0.3 0.4 10.37 2.32
0.6 0.3 0.8 6.23 0.58
0.6 0.5 0.1 4.22 0.59
0.6 0.5 0.2 3.42 1.08
0.6 0.5 0.4 1.68 0.59
0.6 0.5 0.8 0.07 0.00
0.8 0.1 0.4 31.21 11.58
0.8 0.1 0.8 20.51 8.33
0.8 0.3 0.2 30.34 12.99
0.8 0.3 0.4 24.79 9.09
0.8 0.3 0.8 15.49 3.58
0.8 0.5 0.1 23.11 6.83
0.8 0.5 0.2 26.43 7.50
0.8 0.5 0.4 20.19 6.84
0.8 0.5 0.8 11.13 2.35
0.8 0.7 0.1 41.93 0.00
0.8 0.7 0.2 37.01 1.52
0.8 0.7 0.4 23.40 1.14
0.8 0.7 0.8 2.80 0.00
Table 4: Agency costs (AC) incurred (in %) with and without a financial covenant.
39
B Covenants Under Monopolistic Lending
We re-evaluate the effectiveness of covenants when the lender operates in a monopolistic market.
This may be relevant in cases where the collateral is highly specialized, and only a confined number
of lenders have the adequate expertise as far as valuation, assessment and potential liquidation are
concerned. Furthermore, several papers in the operations management literature have considered
this alternative setting, e.g., Buzacott and Zhang (2004), Dada and Hu (2008), and Boyabatlı and
Toktay (2011).
Under a monopolistic lending market, both players choose their actions to maximize their ex-
pected profits. We consider a Stackelberg game in the setting described in Section 3 (i.e., under
0/1 liquidation), with the bank leading by choosing the contract κ, and the firm choosing q solv-
ing (3). Let q?(κ) be its optimal order quantity, assumed unique to avoid unnecessary technical
complications. The sequence of events under this alternative game is illustrated in Figure 6.
t = 0 t = 1 t = 2
demand revealed &contract signed
B R
κ
D
L
...........................︸ ︷︷ ︸ .........................︸ ︷︷ ︸ ..........................︸ ︷︷ ︸
subgame S with
outcomes C or L
demand
revealed
C
d2
D
S
{piR;piB}
{piR;piB}
d1q
Figure 6: Game under a monopolistic lending market.
The bank’s choice of contract κ is now affected by certain trade-offs involving the firm’s response.
Ceteris paribus, as the bank increases the covenant tightness, her expected profit increases, while
the firm’s expected profit decreases. The latter fact might then induce the firm to adjust its order
quantity in order to mitigate its losses, a strategic response that may reduce the bank’s profit,
as well. Furthermore, the interaction of the covenant with other contract terms is potentially
unclear. One may speculate that the protection afforded by a covenant might be equivalent to an
interest rate increase, as far the lender’s expected profit is concerned. However, as highlighted in
the discussion in Section 4.4, covenants allow lenders to dynamically react as new information is
revealed, unlike interest rates.
The next result formalizes the conditions under which covenants persist in equilibrium under a
monopolistic lending market, connecting them with bankruptcy risk.
Theorem 8. In equilibrium,19 under a monopolistic lending market, a covenant is necessarily
19We assume that ∂
2piR
∂q2
|q? < 0 holds. This technical condition is rather harmless in practice. It is only slightly
stronger than requiring q? to be a strict local optimum of piR.
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included if and only if there is liquidation conflict. Furthermore, in equilibrium, bankruptcy risk is
(i) a sufficient condition for covenants to be included in non-shrinking markets, and
(ii) neither sufficient, nor necessary for covenants to be included in shrinking markets.
In a certain sense, the results mirror the findings under a perfectly competitive lending market.
More precisely, under liquidation conflict, including covenants is always optimal for the lender,
despite the strategic response of the firm, so that covenants emerge as necessary terms in lending
agreements, non-substitutable by adjustments to interest rates and/or loan limits. Note that this
is in contrast with the relationship between the latter two terms: it is known that, in the absence
of other considerations, loan limits are substitutable by interest rates under monopolistic lending
markets (see, e.g., Buzacott and Zhang 2004, Dada and Hu 2008).
However, different from the results under perfect competition, the optimal covenant in a mo-
nopolistic setting does not necessarily restore first best. This is also supported by our extensive
numerical studies described below, and is not surprising (Dada and Hu 2008 find a similar insight
in a single-period newsvendor model, where lenders only optimize interest rates). Correspondingly,
the optimal covenant does not alleviate operational distortions, either—in particular, the surprising
non-threshold policies we found in Section 4 can persist in equilibrium (see Appendix C.2).
Interestingly, when compared with our earlier results in Theorem 4, bankruptcy is no longer a
necessary condition for covenants to exist in non-shrinking markets, but is still sufficient. Loosely
speaking, covenants are no longer synonymous with bankruptcy risk, but are just implied by it.
The reason behind this discrepancy is that, by using covenants, a monopolist bank may be able
to completely eliminate bankruptcy risk in some cases. In shrinking markets, bankruptcy risk is
no longer indicative for the presence of covenants. Specifically, it is possible that contracts include
convenants that in fact eliminate bankruptcy risk, as remarked above, or that there is bankruptcy
risk that does not necessarily result in liquidation conflict, and thus makes covenants superflu-
ous. It is interesting to note that Theorem 8, interpreted in a different light, also suggests that
covenants would be more prevalent under monopolistic settings compared to perfect competition
(after adjusting for bankruptcy risk).
To conclude this section, we note that although covenants emerge once again as critical con-
tractual terms in debt agreements, they play a different role under a monopolistic setting, serving
more as a value extraction mechanism for the lender, rather than a vehicle for restoring firm value.
C Robustness of Non-threshold Liquidation Policies
In this section, we confirm that our insights and results pertaining to non-threshold policies are
robust, and persist under more general demand distributions, as well as in equilibrium.
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C.1 General Demand Distribution
Our main treatment concerning the players’ liquidation policies was conducted under Assumption 1,
namely that the second period demand was following a discrete, two-point conditional distribution.
In this context, we showed that, under debt, any of the players may find it optimal to follow a non-
threshold liquidation policy (see Lemma 2 and Lemma 4). We show that these insights continue
to hold for much more general demand distributions.
Theorem 9. Suppose that, conditional on the first period demand, the second period demand dis-
tribution has a log-concave density function. Then, the firm may follow a non-threshold liquidation
policy. In particular, its liquidation policy has at most two switching points, i.e., there exist (not
necessarily identical) ξ1, ξ2 ∈ [0, q] with ξ1 ≤ ξ2, such that
`R(q, d) = 1{d ∈ (ξ1, ξ2)}.
Moreover, the bank also follows a liquidation policy with at most two switching points, and the result
is true for any second period demand distribution.
We note that log-concave distributions (i.e., with probability densities whose logarithm is a
concave function) have been studied extensively in operations management (they are also known
as Polya frequency of order 2—see, e.g., Porteus (2002) for an overview). It is known that many of
the common distributions are log-concave, for instance the exponential, the reflected exponential,
the uniform, the Erlang, the normal, and all truncations, translations and convolutions of such
distributions (Porteus 2002). In this sense, our assumption on the demand is not very limiting, and
is well aligned with standard assumptions made in operations management.
The result confirms that two types of liquidation policies are possible. A player either follows
a threshold policy, i.e., liquidating below a demand threshold and continuing above (where the
threshold can also be 0 or q), or follows a non-threshold policy, preferring continuation below a
threshold ξ1 and above a threshold ξ2 > ξ1, and preferring liquidation between ξ1 and ξ2. These
are exactly the two possible patterns encountered in our base model (see Lemma 2 and Lemma 4),
and, as such, our insights concerning the implication of non-threshold liquidation policies persist.
C.2 Non-threshold Policies in Equilibrium
We now confirm that, when the lender is monopolistic, non-threshold policies can persist in equilib-
rium, for either of the players. We provide both sufficient conditions, as well as particular instances.
Proposition 1. (a) [Firm] Suppose that s < c(M−1)M−c , M < M˜ , and D1 ≥ x0c− sM
M+s−1
> 0 almost
surely. Then, the firm always follows a non-threshold liquidation policy in equilibrium. One such
instance is given by s = 116 , c =
1
4 , x0 = 1 and M =
3
2 .
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(b) [Bank] Suppose that s < (M−1)c2(M−c) and D1 ≥ (M−1+2s)x0c(M−1+2s)−2Ms > 0 almost surely. Then, the bank
always follows a non-threshold liquidation policy in equilibrium. One such instance is given by
s = 116 , c =
1
4 , x0 = 1 and M = 2.
D Proofs
To simplify notation slightly, we sometimes omit showing the explicit dependency of some quantities
on q, d and/or δ, e.g., debt, revenues, profits, etc.
D.1 Liquidation Policies
We use the following notation for the two possible values of the critical quantity qD, see (2),
q1D
def
=
Rx0
Rc− 2sM−1+2s
, q2D =
Rx0
Rc− sMM+s−1
.
Proof of Lemma 1. Consider a fixed order quantity q ≤ x0c . We seek the firm’s liquidation policy
as a function of the first period demand realization, D1 = d. If d ≥ q, the firm is out of stock, and
is indifferent between continuation and liquidation. As such, we consider d < q.
The revenues from a liquidation action are given by xR,L (q, d) = XR,L (q, d) = (1 − s)d + sq.
In view of Assumption 1, the expected revenues from continuation are given by
xR,C (q, d) = E
[
min(d+D2, q) |D1 = d
]
=

M+1
2 d, if d ≤ qM
q+d
2 , if
q
M < d ≤ q.
Note that xR,L (q, ·) is an affine function of d for d ∈ [0, q], with slope 1 − s. Also, xR,C (q, ·) is
continuous and piece-wise affine in d, with slope M+12 for d ∈ [0, qM ], and slope 12 for d ∈ ( qM , q].
Furthermore, xR,L (q, 0) = sq > xR,C (q, 0) = 0, and xR,L (q, q) = xR,C (q, q). As such,
since s < 12 (by Assumption 2), we immediately have that: xR,C (q, d) > xR,L (q, d), ∀ d ∈( q
M , q
)
;xR,L (q, d) > xR,C (q, d), ∀ d ∈ (0, ξ); and xR,L (q, d) < xR,C (q, d), ∀ d ∈
(
ξ, qM
)
, where
ξ = sqM−1
2
+s
is the solution to the equation M+12 d = (1 − s)d + sq. It can be readily checked that
this exactly corresponds to the liquidation policy `fb(q, d) described in the lemma.
Proof of Lemma 2. Consider a fixed order quantity q > x0c , resulting in a debt Rw(q) = cq−x0.
We seek to characterize the firm’s liquidation policy as a function of the realized demand D1 = d,
at the given order quantity q.
We first argue that the policy does not depend on whether the covenant is breached, i.e., it is
identical in the upper and lower nodes of subgame S at t = 1 (see Figure 4(b)). In the lower node
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of the subgame, when the covenant is not breached, the firm is the sole player responsible for the
liquidation/continuation decision, and obtains its optimal policy by solving the problem:
max
`∈{0,1}
` ·XR,L (q, d) + (1− `) · E
[
XR,C (q, d,D2) |D1 = d
]
.
We claim that this problem also yields an optimal policy in the upper node of the subgame, i.e.,
when there is a covenant breach. Here, the firm solves the following problem:
max
`∈{0,1}
[
`+ (1− `)`?B
] ·XR,L (q, d) + (1− `)(1− `?B) · E[XR,C (q, d,D2) |D1 = d],
where `?B denotes the bank’s optimal response. Note that, if `
?
B = 1, the firm’s profits are indepen-
dent of its decision. When `?B = 0, the two problems above are equivalent.
The firm’s revenues from liquidation as a function of D1 = d are
xR,L (d) = XR,L (q, d) =

0, if d ≤ dS
(1− s)d+ sq −Rw, if dS < d ≤ q
q −Rw, if q < d.
(8)
Here, dS
def
= Rw−sq1−s denotes the demand level for “accounting insolvency,” i.e., the demand such
that, by liquidating all remaining inventory, the firm is exactly able to replay the entire debt Rw.
As d raises just above dS, the firm’s revenues increase linearly, with a slope of 1 − s, and then
saturate upon stock-out, at d = q. Similarly, its expected revenues from continuation are
xR,C (d) = E
[
XR,C (q, d,D2) |D1 = d
]
= E
[
(min(d+D2, q)−Rw)+ |D1 = d
]
.
In view of Assumption 1, this expression simplifies to the following cases:
if Rw <
q
M
,
xR,C (d) =

0, if d ≤ RwM
Md−Rw
2 , if
Rw
M < d ≤ Rw
M+1
2 d−Rw, if Rw < d ≤ qM
d+q
2 −Rw, if qM < d ≤ q
q −Rw, if q < d,
(9)
if Rw ≥ q
M
,
xR,C (d) =

0, if d ≤ RwM
Md−Rw
2 , if
Rw
M < d ≤ qM
q−Rw
2 , if
q
M < d ≤ Rw
d+q
2 −Rw, if Rw < d ≤ q
q −Rw, if q < d.
(10)
By continuing, the firm’s revenues are exactly zero if d falls below RwM , and then increase in a
piece-wise linear fashion, initially with a slope of M2 , before saturating upon stock-out, at d = q.
The firm’s liquidation decision exactly entails comparing xR,L (d) with xR,C (d), and liquidating
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(continuing) if the former (latter) is strictly larger. Several cases emerge, depending on whether
dS ≷ RwM and 1 − s ≷ M2 . These are treated in Propositions 2 and 3, and are summarized below.
From Proposition 2, if M ≥ M˜ , an optimal liquidation policy for the firm is:
`R(q, d) =
1{d < dR(q)}, if s < s1D and q > q1D,1{d < dfb(q)}, otherwise. (11)
Furthermore, `R(q, d) ≤ `(q, d) always holds. From Proposition 3, if M < M˜ , an optimal liquidation
policy is:
`R(q, d) =
1
{
d ∈
[
0, Rw(q)M
)
∪
(
dR(q), dfb(q)
)}
, if s < s2D and q > q
2
D,
1{d < dfb(q)}, otherwise.
(12)
Furthermore, `R(q, d) ≤ `fb(q, d) holds, unless s < min(s1D, s2D) and q > max(q1D, q2D).
By defining qD as in the statement of the lemma, it can be readily verified that these policies
exactly reduce to the desired ones.
Proof of Lemma 3. We first show that for M ≥ M˜ , q > qD holds if and only if dfb < Rw. To
see this, note that
Rw − dfb = (s
1
D − s)q
2(1−Rc)(M − 1 + 2s) −Rx0 =
(s1D − s)(q − q1D)
2(1−Rc)(M − 1 + 2s) . (13)
If q > qD holds, that implies that qD = q
1
D < q, as well as s < s
1
D. Combining these with (13), we
get that dfb < Rw. On the other hand, if s ≥ s1D, then q ≤ qD = ∞ holds, and by (13) we also
have dfb > Rw. If s < s1D and q ≤ qD = q1D holds, we also have dfb ≥ Rw. Hence, dfb < Rw implies
q > qD.
We now prove the claim of the Lemma in case `R is followed. The proof in case `fb is followed is
similar and is omitted. Consider the case when q > qD. Then, forM ≥ M˜ , we argued that dfb < Rw.
However, `R(q, dfb) = 0, i.e., if the first period demand is equal to dfb, there is continuation which
would then lead to bankruptcy if the second period demand is zero. For M < M˜ , we have that
`R(q, RwM ) = 0, which again would lead to the same result. As such, q > qD is a sufficient condition
for bankruptcy risk.
To show that q > qD is also necessary for bankruptcy risk when M ≥ 3, let us suppose, for the
sake of contradiction, that q ≤ qD and that there is bankruptcy risk. First note that
(1− s)dS = Rw − sq < Rw − dfb ≤ 0,
where the first inequality holds since M ≥ 3, and the second since M ≥ M˜ and q ≤ qD. Since dS
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is negative, there is no bankruptcy risk at t = 1. Also, continuation occurs only if d ≥ dfb at t = 1
and cannot thus lead to bankruptcy.
Finally, to show that q > qD is not necessary for bankruptcy risk when M < 3, consider the
case when q = 27, c = 0.5, s = 716 , R =
13
8 , M =
5
4 and x0 = 1. Then, we get s
1
D =
13
24 > s,
qD = q
1
D = 46.8 > q, dS =
136
9 > 0 and d
fb = 21 > dS. As such, for this example q ≤ qD, but there
is bankruptcy risk at t = 1, since 0 < dS < d
fb.
Proof of Lemma 4. Consider a fixed order quantity q > x0c , resulting in a debt Rw(q), and seek
to characterize the banks’s liquidation policy as a function of the realized demand D1 = d, at the
given order quantity q. In view of Assumption 1, the bank’s expected revenues from liquidation
(xB,L ) and continuation (xB,C ) as a function of D1 = d are respectively given by:
xB,L (d) = XB,L (q, d) =
(1− s)d+ sq, if d ≤ dSRw, if dS < d, (14a)
xB,C (d) = E
[
XB,C (q,D1, D2 |D1 = d)
]
=

(M+1)d
2 , if d ≤ RwM
d+Rw
2 , if
Rw
M < d ≤ Rw
Rw, if Rw < d,
(14b)
where dS
def
= Rw−sq1−s . Note that the bank is indifferent if d ≥ Rw, since, in that case, the first period
sales alone are sufficient to cover the entire debt. As such, we focus the discussion of the liquidation
decision to cases where d < Rw.
It can be readily checked that xB,L and xB,C are both continuous and concave in d, with
xB,L (0) > xB,C (0) and xB,L (d) > xB,C (d), ∀ d ∈ (dS, Rw). As such, the bank strictly prefers
liquidation for “sufficiently low” or “sufficiently high” demands (i.e., larger than dS). In fact, by
comparing (14a) and (14b), it can be seen that two cases can arise:
Case 1: If xB,L
(
Rw
M
) ≥ xB,C (RwM ), then xB,L (d) ≥ xB,C (d), ∀ d ∈ [0, Rw), so that the optimal
liquidation policy for the bank is `B(q, d) = 1{d < dB(q)}.
Case 2: If xB,L
(
Rw
M
)
< xB,C
(
Rw
M
)
, then there exist two demand levels ξ1 ∈
(
0, RwM
]
and ξ2 ∈[
Rw
M , dS
)
, such that `B(q, d) = 1
{
d ∈ [0, ξ1) ∪ (ξ2, Rw)
}
. Here, ξ1 =
sq
M−1
2
+s
= dfb(q) is the
solution of the equation (1 − s)d + sq = (M+1)d2 , and ξ2 = Rw−2qs1−2s is the solution to the equation
(1− s)d+ sq = d+Rw2 .
Finally, note that xB,L
(
Rw
M
)
< xB,C
(
Rw
M
)
holds if and only if
(
M−1
2 + s
)
Rx0 <
[(
M−1
2 + s
)
Rc−
Ms
]
q. Since the left term is always strictly positive, the inequality either never holds (when the
term multiplying q is non-positive, which is equivalent to s ≥ sB), or results in a valid lower bound
on q, equal to qB (and valid only for s < sB). As such, Case 2 arises if and only if s < sB and
q > qB, which completes the proof.
46
Proof of Lemma 5. The proof follows readily by unifying the cases from Lemma 2 and Lemma 4.
We omit it for space considerations.
D.1.1 Auxiliary Results
Proposition 2. For M ≥ M˜ def= 2(1−s), an optimal liquidation policy for the firm is given by (11).
Furthermore, `R(q, d) ≤ `fb(q, d), for all q and d.
Proof. We follow the same notation as in the proof of Lemma 2. Several cases emerge.
Case 1: RwM < dS or {RwM ≤ dS and M < M˜}. By comparing (8) with (9) and (10), it can be readily
checked that xR,C (d) > xR,L (d), ∀ d ∈
(
Rw
M ,
q
M
]
, since xR,C has slopes M2 (or
M+1
2 ), which are
larger than 1−s (strictly larger when M < M˜ , and at least as large, but with xR,C (dS) > xR,L (dS)
when M = M˜). Combining with Proposition 4, we can see that the optimal liquidation policy for
the firm becomes `R(d) = 1
{
d < RwM
}
. To check that this corresponds to (11), note from the
definition of dR and (15d) that in Case 1 we have dR(q) = RwM . Furthermore, (15b) and (15c)
imply that s < s1D and q > q
1
D holds, which concludes the proof of the case.
Case 2: M = 2(1− s) and RwM = dS. This is a degenerate case, where xR,C (d) = xR,L (d), ∀ d ∈[
Rw
M ,min(Rw,
q
M )
]
, and xR,C (d) > xR,L (d), ∀ d ∈
(
min(Rw, qM ), q
)
. As such, any policy of the
form `R(d) = 1
{
d < ξ
}
, for some ξ ∈ [RwM ,min(Rw, qM )] is optimal. Without loss, we can take
ξ = RwM , but also ξ = Rw. Note that, in this case, dR(q) =
Rw(q)
M , and (15h) implies d
fb(q) = Rw(q).
Therefore, both branches in (11) yield optimal policies.
Case 3: RwM > dS. It can be readily seen that xR,L (d) > xR,C (d), ∀ d ∈
(
dS,
Rw
M
]
. Furthermore,
by Proposition 4, xR,L (d) < xR,C (d), ∀ d ∈
( q
M , q
)
. Therefore, xR,L and xR,C must intersect for
some d ∈ (RwM , qM ). We distinguish two sub-cases.
Case 3-A: Rw ≥ qM . By (10), xR,L and xR,C are both affine functions on
(
Rw
M ,
q
M
)
, with
slopes 1 − s and M2 , respectively. We must also have M < M˜ (if M = M˜ , the two lines would be
parallel and there could be no intersection). In this case, the policy is given by:
xR,L (d) > xR,C (d), ∀ d ∈
[Rw
M
, ξ
)
and xR,L (d) < xR,C (d), ∀ d ∈
(
ξ,
q
M
)
,
where ξ = 2sq−Rw
M−M˜ is the solution to the equation
Md−Rw
2 = (1− s)d+ sq −Rw.
To see that this exactly corresponds to (11), note first that, by (15d), ξ = dR(q), which proves
that, in Case 3-A, `R(q, d) = 1{d < dR(q)}. Then, (15c) implies that {s < s1D and q > q1D} must
hold, which concludes the proof.
Case 3-B: Rw < qM . In this case, (9) implies that the (unique) demand level d where xR,L (d) =
xR,C (d) can occur for either d ∈ (RwM , Rw] or d ∈ [Rw, qM ). The former (latter) occurs if and only
if xR,C (Rw) is larger (smaller) than xR,L (Rw).
• If xR,C (Rw) > xR,L (Rw), the demand level satisfying xR,L (d) = xR,C (d) is the solution to
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the equation Md−Rw2 = (1 − s)d + sq − Rw, identical to Case 3-A. As such, we again have
that `R(q, d) = 1{d < dR(q)}.
• If xR,C (Rw) ≤ xR,L (Rw), the demand level satisfying xR,L (d) = xR,C (d) is the solution to
the equation (M+1)d2 = (1 − s)d + sq, which is exactly sqM−1
2
+s
= dfb. As such, we conclude
that `R(q, d) = 1{d < dfb(q)}.
To see that this corresponds to (11), note that (15b) implies that xR,C (Rw) > xR,L (Rw) holds
if and only if {s < s1D and q > q1D}, which is exactly what is required for (11).
Finally, to see that `R(q, d) ≤ `fb(q, d) holds for all q and d, note that (15f) and (15g) imply
that dfb(q) < dR(q) can only hold if s < s1D and q > q
1
D. As such, (11) directly leads to the desired
conclusion.
Proposition 3. For M < M˜
def
= 2(1 − s), an optimal liquidation policy for the firm is given
by (12). Furthermore, the following modified policy ̂`R(q, d) is also optimal for the firm, and
satisfies ̂`R(q, d) ≤ `fb(q, d) for any q and any d:
̂`R(q, d) =
0 if {M < M˜} and {s < min(s1D, s2D)} and {q > max(q1D, q2D)}`R(q, d) otherwise.
Proof. We follow the same notation as in the proof of Lemma 2. Several cases emerge.
Case 1: RwM ≤ dS. In this case, we have that xR,C (dS) ≥ xR,L (dS) = 0, and (15a) also implies
that {s < s2D} and q ≥ q2D, i.e., we are in the first case of (12). Two sub-cases emerge.
Case 1-A: Rw ≥ qM . In this case, (10) and Proposition 4 imply that xR,C (d) > xR,L (d), ∀ d ∈(
Rw
M , q
)
. This is equivalent to the optimal liquidation policy `R(q, d) = 1
{
d < Rw(q)M
}
. To see that
this is equivalent to (12), note that Case 1-A and (15c) imply that s < s1D and q > q
1
D, which,
by (15f), implies that dfb(q) ≤ dR(q), so that
(
dR(q), dfb(q)
)
= ∅.
Case 1-B: Rw < qM . Here, we have xR,C (d) > xR,L (d), ∀ d ∈ (RwM , dS]∪ [ qM , q). In the interval
(dS,
q
M ), xR,C is piecewise-affine, with two pieces, and xR,L is affine. Two possibilities emerge:
• If xR,C (Rw) ≥ xR,L (Rw), then xR,C (d) ≥ xR,L (d), ∀ d ∈ (RwM , q), and xR,C and xR,L have
at most one point of tangency in (dS,
q
M ), so the liquidation policy becomes `R(q, d) = 1
{
d <
Rw(q)
M
}
. To see that this corresponds to (12), note that (15b) implies that {s < s1D and q ≥ q1D},
which, by (15f), implies that
(
dR(q), dfb(q)
)
= ∅.
• If xR,C (Rw) < xR,L (Rw), then xR,C and xR,L have two intersection points. One such
point is given by the solution to the equation Md−Rw2 = (1 − s)d + sq − Rw, i.e., 2sq−RwM−2(1−s) .
By (15e), this is exactly dR(q). The other such point is the solution to the equation
(M+1)d
2 =
(1− s)d+ sq, which is exactly sqM−1
2
+s
= dfb. By (15b) and (15f), we also have dfb(q) > dR(q),
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so that the liquidation policy is `R(q, d) = 1
{
d ∈
[
0, Rw(q)M
)
∪
(
dR(q), dfb(q)
)}
, which
exactly corresponds to (12).
Case 2: RwM > dS. In this case, we claim that Rw <
q
M . To see this, note that Rw ≥ qM and
xR,L (wRM ) > xR,C (
wR
M ) = 0 would imply, through (10), that xR,L (
q
M ) > xR,C (
q
M ), since the slope
of the liquidation profits (1 − s) is greater than the slope of the continuation profits (M2 ). The
latter would be in direct contradiction with Proposition 4. Since Rw < qM , a similar reasoning to
the one above applied to the profits in (9) shows that xR,L (Rw) > xR,C (Rw), so that
xR,L (d) > xR,C (d), ∀ d ∈ (0, ξ) and xR,L (d) < xR,C (d), ∀ d ∈
(
ξ,
q
M
)
,
where ξ is the solution to the equation (M+1)d2 = (1− s)d+ sq, which is exactly sqM−1
2
+s
= dfb. As
such, `R(q, d) = 1{d < dfb(q)}. To see that this exactly corresponds to (12), note that RwM > dS
and (15a) imply that {s < s2D and q > q2D} cannot hold.
To see that the modified policy ̂`R(q, d) satisfies ̂`R(q, d) ≤ `fb(q, d), note from (12) that the
only case where `R(q, d) ≤ `fb(q, d) might not hold is when s < s2D, q > q2D, and dfb(q) < RwM ,
i.e., by (15g), s < s1D, q > q
1
D. In this case, `R(q, d) = 1{d < wRM }. However, by (15a), note that
wR
M < dS, so that the firm is actually indifferent between liquidation and continuation, so that the
policy ̂`R(q, d) is also optimal.
Proposition 4. xR,C (d) > xR,L (d), ∀ d ∈ [ qM , q), i.e., `R(q, d) = `fb(q, d) = 0, ∀ d ∈ [ qM , q).
Proof. The result trivially holds if qM < dS, so we only consider the reverse case. We distinguish
two cases, depending on whether Rw ≷ qM .
If Rw < qM , note from (9) that xR,C and xR,L are affine in d ∈ [ qM , q], and xR,C (q) = xR,L (q).
Showing the main result is thus equivalent to arguing xR,C ( qM ) > xR,L (
q
M ), which holds, since:
xR,C
( q
M
)
− xR,L
( q
M
)
=
q(M − 1)(1− 2s)
2M
> 0, since s <
1
2
and M > 1.
If Rw ≥ qM , note from (10) that xR,C is constant for d ∈ [ qM , Rw], and affine, with slope 12 for
d ∈ (Rw, q]. Since xR,L is affine for d ∈ ( qM , q], with slope 0 ≤ s < 12 , and xR,C (q) = xR,L (q), to
argue the result, it suffices to show that xR,C (Rw) > xR,L (Rw), which holds, since
xR,C (Rw)− xR,L (Rw) = (q −Rw)
(1
2
− s
)
> 0, since q > Rw and s <
1
2
.
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Proposition 5. We have:20
Rw
M
(<)
≤ dS ⇔ {s < s2D and q
(>)
≥ q2D} (15a)
If Rw <
q
M
, then xR,C (Rw)
(>)
≥ xR,L (Rw) ⇔ {s < s1D and q
(>)
≥ q1D} (15b)
Rw ≥ q
M
⇒ {s < s1D and q > q1D} (15c)
If M > 2(1− s), then dR(q) = Rw(q)
M
⇔ Rw
M
≤ dS (15d)
If M < 2(1− s), then dR(q) = Rw(q)
M
⇔ Rw
M
≥ dS (15e)
IfM < 2(1− s), dfb(q)
(<)
≤ 2sq −Rw
M − 2(1− s) ⇔ {s < s
1
D and q
(>)
≥ q1D} (15f)
dfb(q) ≤ Rw
M
⇒ {s < s1D and q > q1D} (15g){
M = 2(1− s) and Rw
M
= dS
}
⇒ dfb(q) = Rw(q). (15h)
Proof. Throughout this proof, recall that 0 < Rc ≤ 1, M > 1, and s < 12 .
To prove (15a), note that RwM ≤ dS holds if and only if:
x0R(M + s− 1)
M(1− s) ≤
(cR− s
1− s −
cR
M
)
q.
Since the left term is always strictly positive, the inequality either never holds (when the term
multiplying q is non-positive, which is equivalent to s ≥ s2D), or results in a valid lower bound on q
(equal to q2D, and valid only for s < s
2
D). The strict version of the inequality follows similarly.
To prove (15b), note that, by (9), xR,C (Rw) ≥ xR,L (Rw) holds if and only if:
M − 1 + 2s
2
Rx0 ≤
(M − 1 + 2s
2
Rc− s
)
q. (16)
Since the left term is always strictly positive, the inequality either never holds (when the term
multiplying q is non-positive, which is equivalent to s ≥ s1D), or results in a valid lower bound on q
(equal to q1D, and valid only for s < s
1
D). The strict version of the inequality follows similarly.
To prove (15c), note first that Rw ≥ qM is equivalent to
(MRc− 1)q ≥MRx0 ⇔
{
MRc > 1 and q ≥ MRx0
MRc− 1
}
. (17)
We first show that MRc > 1 implies s < s1D. To this end, note that the latter is equivalent to
Rc > 2sM+2s−1 . But MRc > 1 implies Rc >
1
M , and
1
M >
2s
M+2s−1 ⇔ M − 1 > 2s(M − 1) ⇔
20In order to save space, since we require both the strict and non-strict versions of the inequalities, we use a compact
notation that shows in parenthesis the alternate versions.
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s < 12 , which is always true. Therefore, s < s
1
D, which implies, by (16), that q
1
D > 0. To see that
q > q1D, note that (17) also requires q >
MRx0
MRc−1 , and we always have:
MRx0
MRc−1 >
Rx0
Rc− 2s
M−1+2s
⇔
M − 1 + 2s > 2Ms ⇔ 1 > 2s.
To prove (15d) and (15e), note that dR = RwM holds if and only if
Rw
M ≥ 2sq−RwM−2+2s . The latter
inequality is exactly equivalent to
(M + s− 1)Rx0 ≤
[
M(Rc− s)−Rc(1− s)]q if M > 2(1− s),
(M + s− 1)Rx0 ≥
[
M(Rc− s)−Rc(1− s)]q if M < 2(1− s).
The former condition is exactly equivalent to condition (17), i.e., to RwM ≤ dS. Similarly, the latter
is equivalent to RwM ≥ dS.
To prove (15f), note that the relation is equivalent, under M < 2(s− 1), to Rx0(M + 2s− 1) ≤[
(M − 1)Rc − 2s(1 − Rc)]q, which is exactly (16). By the same arguments as in (15b), this is
equivalent to {s < s1D and q ≥ q1D}.
To prove (15g), note that the condition is equivalent to Rx0(M + 2s− 1) ≤
[
(M + 2s− 1)Rc−
2sM
]
q. Comparing this with (16), it can be seen that the left-hand-sides are identical, while the
term multiplying q here is smaller than in (16). As such, if the relation above holds, it must be
that s < s1D and q > q
1
D.
To prove (15h), note that dfb(q)−Rw becomes equal in this case to:
2sq
M + 2s− 1 −Rw = sq
[ 2
M + 2s− 1 −
M
M + s− 1
]
= 0,
where the first equality follows by expressing Rw from the identity Rw = Rw−sq1−s , and the second
follows by using M = 2(1− s).
D.2 Perfect Competition
To simplify the exposition, we introduce some notation. Let R : R → [1,∞) and δ : R → R+
be functions that map an order quantity to an interest rate and a covenant demand threshold
requirement. In this section, we denote a contract under these terms with κ = (R, δ), and the set
of all such competitively priced loans with K.
Consider also the following three particular competitively priced contracts of interest:
(a) κ0 = (R0, δ0), with δ0(q) ≡ 0;
(b) κ1 = (R1, δ1), with δ1(q) ≡ 2sqM+2s−1 ;
(c) (Rfb, 0), offered to a firm following the first best actions, i.e., ordering qfb, and liquidating
according to `fb. Let qfbD be as in Lemma 2, calculated using R
fb.
Finally, we derive the first order optimality conditions (FOC) that are necessary and sufficient
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for the first best order quantity qfb. Note that, using Lemma 1, we can express (1) as
V (q) =
∫ dfb
0
(sq + (1− s)u)f1(u)du+ 1
2
∫ q
M
dfb
(M + 1)uf1(u)du
+
1
2
∫ q
q
M
(q + u)f1(u)du+
∫ ∞
q
qf1(u)du− cq, ∀q ≥ 0.
Thus, the FOC is: 1 + sF1(d
fb) = 12F1(q/M) +
1
2F1(q) + c.
We present the proofs in the same order in which theorems appear in the next. However, the
proofs of Theorems 1 and 2 rely on the proof of Theorem 4.
Proof of Theorem 1. (i) If x0 ≥ x˜0, by Theorem 4(b) we have that qfb ≤ qfbD . By Proposition 6,
the firm prefers κ0, which does not have covenants, orders q
fb and follows `fb.
(ii) Suppose now that x0 < x˜0. Let g(q, x0) denote the threshold qD evaluated under the interest
rate R0(q) for a firm with initial capital of x0, i.e.,
g(q, x0)
def
=
R0(q)x0
R0(q)c− θ ,
where θ is defined as in the proof of Theorem 4. Arguing in precisely the same way as in (19),
since R0(q) and R
fb have the same monotonicity in x0, by Proposition 7, we have that g(q
fb, x0) is
increasing in x0. Based on Theorem 4(b) and Proposition 6, g(q
fb, x˜0) = q
fb. By the monotonicity
of g(qfb, x0) with respect to x0, we then get that
qfb = g(qfb, x˜0) > g(q
fb, x0). (18)
Suppose now that in equilibrium the firm orders q? and follows `fb. Then, by Lemma 2,
q? ≤ g(q?, x0).
Note also that g(q, x0) is decreasing in q. To see this,
∂g(q, x0)
∂q
=
∂g(q, x0)
∂R0
∂R0
∂w
∂w
∂q
< 0,
since the first multiplier above is negative, the second is positive by Proposition 7, and the third is
equal to c. If q? ≥ qfb, we get q? ≥ qfb > g(qfb, x0) > g(q?, x0), a contradiction. Hence, q? < qfb.
Finally, if the firm follows `R < `fb in equilibrium, then, since its expected profits are equal to
V when following `R, q? solves the FOC sF1(dR(q)) + 1 = 12F1(q) +
1
2F1
( q
M
)
+ c. Since qfb solves
the FOC for dfb > dR, and F1, dfb and dR are all increasing in q, we conclude that q? < qfb.
Proof of Theorem 2. The proof follows from Proposition 6.
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Proof of Theorem 3. By Proposition 6, when covenants are present, contract κ1 is optimal and
thus the corresponding covenant demand threshold is exactly equal to δ? = 2sq
fb
M+2s−1 .
To prove the comparative statics, it can be readily checked that:
sgn
(∂δ?
∂s
)
= sgn
[
(M − 1)2qfb︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
+ 2s(M + 2s− 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
∂qfb
∂s
]
sgn
(∂δ?
∂c
)
= sgn
(∂qfb
∂c
)
.
Recall that qfb is the maximizer of V given by (1). It can be readily checked that:
∂2V
∂q∂s
= F1
( 2sq
M + 2s− 1
)
+ sf1
( 2sq
M + 2s− 1
)∂dfb
∂s
≥ 0,
since ∂d
fb
∂s =
2q(M−1)
(M+2s−1)2 ≥ 0. As such, V is supermodular in (q, s) on the lattice R2, so that qfb is
increasing in s (see, e.g., Topkis 1998). Similarly, it can be checked that ∂d
fb
∂c ≤ 0, so that qfb is
decreasing in c.
Proof of Theorem 4. We start with the following useful intermediate result. We prove that
a covenant is necessarily included if and only if there is liquidation conflict. To this end, note
that Proposition 6 implies that, in equilibrium, the order quantity is always qfb, and the liquidation
policy followed is `fb. By definition (see Lemma 5), liquidation conflict exists if and only if qfb > qfbD .
The proof is complete by invoking again Proposition 6.
To prove the dependence on x0, in view of Proposition 6, it is sufficient to show that if q
fb > qfbD
holds for some x¯0, it also holds for any x0 < x¯0. Since q
fb does not depend on x0, it then suffices
to show that qfbD is increasing in x0. Note that
sgn
(
dqfbD
dx0
)
= sgn
[
d
dx0
(
Rfbx0
Rfbc− θ
)]
= sgn
[
Rfb(Rfbc− θ)− x0θ∂R
fb
∂x0
]
, (19)
where θ is independent of x0 (see (2)). Thus, since R
fbc − θ > 0, and Rfb is decreasing in x0, by
Proposition 7, the proof is complete.
The connection with bankruptcy follows from the results of Proposition 6 and Lemma 3.
D.2.1 Auxiliary Results
Proposition 6. In equilibrium, the firm prefers κ0 (κ1) to any other κ ∈ K if qfb ≤ qfbD (qfb > qfbD ).
Moreover, in equilibrium, it orders qfb, and liquidates according to `fb.
Proof. Let piP(q; (R, δ)) be the expected profits of agent P ∈ {R,B} in equilibrium when the order
quantity is q and the contract offered has an interest rate R and a covenant of δ. Then, under
perfect competition piB(q; (Ri(q), δi(q))) = 0, for all q ≥ 0, i ∈ {0, 1}.
53
Let x(q; `) be the net expected revenues at the end of the game, generated by sales and possible
liquidation of the inventory, under an order quantity q and a liquidation policy `. We can express
the firm’s profits as the net expected revenues minus inventory purchasing costs minus the bank’s
profits, that is, for any κ = (R, δ) ∈ K
piR(q; (R(q), δ(q))) = x(q; `κ,q)− cq − piB(q; (R(q), δ(q))) = x(q; `κ,q)− cq,
where `κ,q is the liquidation policy followed in equilibrium under quantity q and contract κ.
Let piκ?R be the firm’s optimal expected profits under contract κ ∈ K. Then,
piκ?R = maxq piR(q; (R(q), δ(q))) = maxq {x(q; `κ,q)− cq} .
Case 1: qfb ≤ qfbD . We argue that R0(qfb) = Rfb. To see this, note that if the firm wishes to order
qfb and the bank offers the contract (Rfb, 0), then, since qfb ≤ qfbD , the firm will follow `fb, according
to Lemma 2. Consequently, we also have `κ0,qfb = `
fb, and
piκ0?R = maxq {x(q; `κ0,q)− cq}
≥ x(qfb; `κ0,qfb)− cqfb
= x(qfb; `fb)− cqfb
≥ sup
κ∈K
max
q
{x(q; `κ,q)− cq}
= sup
κ∈K
piκ?R ≥ piκ0?R ,
where the second inequality follows from the optimality of ordering qfb and following `fb as first
best and the third inequality from the fact that κ0 ∈ K.
Case 2: qfb > qfbD . Consider contract κ1. Then, by the choice of δ1(q), we have that δ1(q) = d
fb(q).
According to Lemma 4, the bank will prefer liquidation for any d1 < d
fb(q). Moreover, since
`R ≤ `fb (see Lemma 2), we have that `κ1,q = `fb. Hence,
piκ1?R = maxq {x(q; `κ1,q)− cq}
= max
q
{
x(q; `fb)− cq
}
= x(qfb; `fb)− cqfb
≥ sup
κ∈K
piκ?R ≥ piκ1?R .
Proposition 7. For any fixed q, R0(q) is decreasing in x0. Similarly, R
fb is decreasing in x0.
Proof. We provide a unifying proof for both quantities. Let R below denote either R0(q) or R
fb.
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Let ζ denote the probability of bankruptcy, and xbr denote the expected channel revenues
conditional on bankruptcy. By definition, xbr < Rw. The bank’s expected profit can be written as
piB = Rw(1− ζ) + xbrζ − w ≡ 0.
As a side remark, this implicit equation yields the R that should be charged by the bank. Using
the implicit function theorem, this then yields:
R(1− ζ)− 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
− (Rw − xbr)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
∂ζ
∂w︸︷︷︸
≥0
+w(1− ζ)∂R
∂w
= 0.
Above, the first term is negative due to the identity piB ≡ 0, and ∂ζ∂w ≥ 0 since, ceteris paribus,
the probability of bankruptcy increases in the size of the principal. Since ∂R∂x0 = −∂R∂w , the proof is
complete.
D.3 Partial Liquidation and Replenishment
Let y1
def
= (q − d1)+ be the leftover inventory after the first-period sales and y be the inventory
position at the beginning of period t = 2, after the liquidation or replenishment actions. Let xP be
the expected cash flow of player P ∈ {R,B} at the end of period t = 2. We denote the conditional
c.d.f. (p.d.f.) of the second period demand with F2|d1 (f2|d1). According to Assumption 3 we get
that F2|d1(x) = FZ
(
2x
(M−1)d1
)
.
It is useful to characterize the corresponding first best inventory decision at t = 1. Let x =
xR + xB denote the net expected cash flow extracted. It is easy to check that
x =
d1 + s · (y1 − y) +
∫
min(u, y)f2|d1(u)du 0 ≤ y ≤ y1
d1 + c · (y1 − y) +
∫
min(u, y)f2|d1(u)du y > y1,
and thus
dx
dy
=
1− s− F2|d1(y) 0 ≤ y ≤ y11− c− F2|d1(y) y > y1.
The first best inventory decision is thus given by
yfb =
min
{
y1,
(M−1)d1
2 ys
}
under partial liq. only
max
[
min
{
y1,
(M−1)d1
2 ys
}
, (M−1)d12 yc
]
under partial liq. and replenishment,
where yj
def
= F−1Z (1− j) for j = c, s.
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Proof of Lemma 6. Let yP be the standalone optimal inventory decision of player P ∈ {R,B}.
Note that `B ≥ (>)`R ⇔ yB ≤ (<)yR. We first show that yR ≥ yfb and yB ≤ yfb. We assume that
d1 < q throughout; for d1 ≥ q the firm stocks out and the players’ actions are trivial.
Firm. Note that xR = E
[
(d1 + s · (q − d1 − y) + min{y,D2} −Rw)+
∣∣D1 = d1].
• For 0 ≤ d1 < dS, to break even at t = 2 the inventory y needs to exceed the minimum demand
threshold uB = (1− s)(dS − d1) + sy. Thus,
xR =
0 y ≤ dS − d1∫∞
uB
(min{u, y} − uB)f2|d1(u)du dS − d1 < y ≤ y1,
and
dxR
dy
=
0 y ≤ dS − d1dx
dy + sF2|d1(uB) dS − d1 < y ≤ y1.
Consequently, we get that
yR
> yfb yfb < y1= yfb otherwise.
• For dS ≤ d1 < Rw, we have that uB ≤ y. However, for small y the threshold uB could become
negative, in which case there is no bankruptcy risk. In particular, we get that
xR =
x−Rw y ≤
1−s
s (d1 − dS)∫∞
uB
(min{u, y} − uB)f2|d1(u)du 1−ss (d1 − dS) < y ≤ y1,
and
dxR
dy
=

dx
dy y ≤ 1−ss (d1 − dS)
dx
dy + sF2|d1(uB)
1−s
s (d1 − dS) < y ≤ y1.
Consequently, we get that yR ≥ yfb.
• For d1 ≥ Rw, there is no bankruptcy risk. Hence, xR = x−Rw and yR = yfb.
Bank. Note that xB = E [min (d1 + s · (q − d1 − y) + min{y,D2}, Rw)|D1 = d1].
• For 0 ≤ d1 < dS, uB = (1− s)(dS − d1) + sy is positive for any feasible y. Thus,
xB =
x y ≤ dS − d1Rw − ∫ uB0 (uB − u)f2|d1(u)du dS − d1 < y ≤ y1,
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and
dxB
dy
=

dx
dy y ≤ dS − d1
−sF2|d1(uB) dS − d1 < y ≤ y1.
Consequently, we get that yB = min{dS − d1, (M−1)d12 ys} ≤ yfb.
• For dS ≤ d1 < Rw, note first that if 1−ss (d1 − dS) < y ≤ y1, we have dxBdy = −sF2|d1(uB) ≤ 0,
so that yB ≤ 1−ss (d1−dS) must hold. In the latter case, the threshold uB is negative, in which
case there is no bankruptcy risk, so without loss we have yB = 0 < yfb.
• For d1 ≥ Rw, there is no bankruptcy risk. Hence, without loss we again have yB = 0 < yfb.
To finish the proof, note that for d1 < dS, if y
fb = y1 we have that yB ≤ dS − d1 < q − d1 =
y1 = yR. If yfb < y1, we have that yB ≤ yfb < yR.
Proof of Lemma 7. If `R ≥ `C, then the firm follows its standalone optimal policy and the
covenant does not get violated, `?R = `R ≥ `C.
If `R < `C, following the firm’s standalone optimal policy would lead to a covenant violation.
In such case, the bank will enforce her optimal decision. According to our analysis in the proof of
Lemma 6, for d ≥ dS we have yB = 0. Thus, the firm’s cash flow, in anticipation of the bank’s, will
be
xR =
xR 0 ≤ y ≤ yCxR|y=0 y > yC,
where yC is the inventory position that corresponds to `C. According to our analysis in the proof
of Lemma 6, for d ≥ dS we also have that
dxR
dy
∣∣∣∣
y=0
=
dx
dy
∣∣∣∣
y=0
= 1− s > 0
Thus, the firm would always prefer an inventory position that does not violate the covenant and
yR ≤ yC, i.e., `?R ≥ `C. To conclude the proof, it is easy to check that yC ≥ 0 for d ≥ dS.
Proof of Theorem 5. We first characterize the threshold x¯0 by following similar steps as in the
proof of Theorem 4. Consider the corresponding interest rate Rfb defined as in Section D.2 and let
qfbS
def
= R
fbx0
Rfbc−s ; this quantity plays the same role as q
fb
D in the proof of Theorem 4. In particular, as
in (19), note that
sgn
(
dqfbS
dx0
)
= sgn
[
d
dx0
(
Rfbx0
Rfbc− s
)]
= sgn
[
Rfb(Rfbc− s)− x0s∂R
fb
∂x0
]
> 0
and thus qfbS is increasing in x0. Let x¯0 be such that q
fb > qfbS if and only if x0 < x¯0.
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For the sake of contradiction, assume now that x0 < x¯0 and for some contract κ ∈ KF we have
that A(κ) = 0. Thus, the first best actions qfb and yfb are followed in equilibrium.
Since x0 < x¯0, we have that q
fb > qfbS , which implies that dS > 0. Consider now the problem that
the firm solves at t = 1 for a demand level d1 < dS such that dS−d1 < (M−1)d12 ys < q−d1. Based on
our analysis in the proof of Lemma 6, we get that yB = dS − d1 < (M−1)d12 ys = yfb. Thus, since yfb
is followed in equilibrium, we get that the covenant is not violated, d1 + s(q− d1− (M−1)d12 ys) ≤ δ.
Similarly, since yR > yfb, the equilibrium action also implies that the covenant is in fact binding,
d1 + s(q − d1 − (M−1)d12 ys) = δ.
Consider now the problem that the firm solves at t = 1 for a demand level d′1 = d1− , for  > 0
small enough such that d′1 < dS and dS − d′1 < (M−1)d
′
1
2 ys < q − d′1 still hold. All arguments made
above still hold. However, the covenant is not binding since
d′1 + s
(
q − d′1 −
(M − 1)d′1
2
ys
)
= d1 + s(q − d1 − (M − 1)d1
2
ys)−
(
1− s− s(M − 1)
2
ys
)
 6= δ
a contradiction.
Proof of Theorem 6. We use notation consistent with the proof of Proposition 6. Let x(q; y)
be the net expected revenues at the end of the game, generated by sales and possible inventory
liquidation, under an order quantity q and an inventory liquidation policy y at t = 1. We can
express the firm’s profits as the net expected revenues minus inventory purchasing costs minus the
bank’s profits, that is, for any κ ∈ KB
piR(q, κ) = x(q; yκ,q)− cq − piB(q, κ) = x(q; yκ,q)− cq,
where yκ,q is the equilibrium inventory liquidation policy followed under quantity q and contract κ.
We first show that the equilibrium inventory liquidation policy under κ? = (α?, β?) ∈ KB is
first best, i.e., yκ?,q = y
fb. If the firm stocks out at t = 1, i.e., d1 ≥ q, all policies are trivial. Thus,
we only consider the case of d1 < q. Note that the covenant condition is equivalent to
d1 + s(y1 − y)︸ ︷︷ ︸
cash
+α? sy︸︷︷︸
inventory
≥ β? ⇔ y ≤ (M − 1)d1
2
ys.
Based on our analysis in the proof of Lemma 6, we get that:
• For d1 < dS,
– for y1 ≤ (M−1)d12 ys, we get that yR = yfb = y1 and since the covenant does not get
violated for this policy, yκ?,q = y
fb.
– for dS−d1 < (M−1)d12 ys < y1, we get that yfb = (M−1)d12 ys < y1 and thus yR > (M−1)d12 ys,
i.e., the covenant would get violated for yR. In that case, we have yB = dS − d1, which
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implies that the firm will be bankrupt if the covenant is violated. Thus, it would prefer
any 0 ≤ y ≤ yfb to avert violation. Since, dxRdy ≥ 0 for all such y, we get that yκ?,q = yfb.
– for (M−1)d12 ys ≤ dS− d1, the firm is bankrupt if y ≤ dS− d1 and the covenant is violated
otherwise. Hence, without loss the firm is indifferent and takes no action leading to a
covenant violation. Then, the bank’s policy is followed in equilibrium and yκ?,q = yB =
(M−1)d1
2 ys = y
fb.
• For dS ≤ d1 ≤ Rw, a covenant violation would transfer control rights to the bank, in which
case yB = 0 would be followed. Specifically,
– for y1 ≤ (M−1)d12 ys, we get that dxRdy ≥ 0 for all 0 ≤ y ≤ y1. Thus, yR = y1 and since the
covenant does not get violated for this policy, yκ?,q = y1 = y
fb.
– for (M−1)d12 ys < y1, since
dxR
dy ≥ 0 for all 0 ≤ y ≤ (M−1)d12 ys we get that yκ?,q =
(M−1)d1
2 ys = y
fb.
• For d1 > Rw, we have that yR = yfb ≤ (M−1)d12 ys and since the covenant does not get violated
for this policy, yκ?,q = y
fb.
We now have
VR(κ?) = max
q
{x(q; yκ?,q)− cq}
≥ x(qfb; yκ?,qfb)− cqfb
= x(qfb; yfb)− cqfb
= V fb
≥ sup
κ∈KB
VR(κ) = VR(κ?).
Thus,
min
κ∈KB
A(κ) ≤ A(κ?) = V
fb − VR(κ?)
V fb
=
V fb − V fb
V fb
= 0
which completes the first part of the proof.
The comparative statics results for α? = 1− 2(1−s)
s(M−1)F−1Z (1−s)
are immediate, since the denomina-
tor is increasing in M and in Z (in the usual stochastic order). Furthermore, since qfb is increasing
in s, M , D1 and Z (in the usual stochastic order), so is β
? = sqfb.
Proof of Theorem 7. We first deal with the case where reordering is financed exclusively with
cash from the lockbox account. The proof uses a similar stream of arguments as the proof of
Theorem 6. Thus, if yκ,q is the equilibrium inventory adjustment policy followed under quantity
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q and contract κ, it suffices to show that the equilibrium inventory liquidation policy under κ? =
(α?, β?) ∈ KB is first best, i.e., yκ?,q = yfb.
Case 1: Suppose that yfb = min
{
y1,
(M−1)d1
2 ys
}
. Note that in that case we get that (M−1)d12 yc ≤
y1, so that y1 = q − d1 > 0. Then, the withdrawal limit of the firm at t = 1 also simplifies to
φb− cq =
(
(M − 1)d1
2
yc − y1
)
c ≤ 0,
so that no replenishment can take place. Hence, the firm follows an inventory adjustment policy
according to our analysis in Theorem 6 and yκ?,q = y
fb.
Case 2: Suppose that yfb = (M−1)d12 yc. Thus, we have that y1 = q − d1 ≤ (M−1)d12 yc < (M−1)d12 ys.
We first argue that the covenant is never violated in this case. In particular, by the withdrawal
limit, we get that c(y − y1) ≤ φb − cq =
(
(M−1)d1
2 yc − y1
)
c and thus y ≤ (M−1)d12 yc < (M−1)d12 ys
and the covenant is never violated.
We next argue that no partial liquidation will be performed in equilibrium, yκ?,q ≥ y1. Based
on our analysis in the proof of Lemma 6, we get that dxRdy ≥ 0 for all y ≤ y1, since y1 < (M−1)d12 ys.
In conjuction with the covenant not being violated we get that yκ?,q ≥ y1.
By combining the two facts above, we conclude that the equilibrium policy will be dictated by
the firm, which would effectively act by maximizing its payoff xR over y1 ≤ y ≤ yfb. Similarly to
our analysis in the proof of Lemma 6, it can be checked that uB = Rw −min{q, d1} − c(y1 − y) is
the minimum second-period demand threshold for the firm to break even. For uB < 0, there is no
bankruptcy risk, xR = x−Rw and the firm follows yR = yfb. For uB ≥ 0, we get that
xR =
∫ y
uB
(u− uB)f2|d1(u)du+
∫ ∞
y
(y − uB)f2|d1(u)du,
and
dxR
dy
=
dx
dy
+ cF2|d1(uB) ≥
dx
dy
≥ 0, ∀y1 ≤ y ≤ yfb.
Consequently, yκ?,q = y
fb.
Finally, we discuss the case where additional funds are required to place the order. In this case,
there will be no agency costs, since the firm will act as a newsvendor, who has no dynamic decisions
left. Thus, first best decisions will always be followed, and the proof is complete.
D.4 Monopoly
For the purposes of this section, it will help to think about the covenant in terms of a cash-flow-
to-debt ratio threshold γ
def
= δRw , instead of the cash flow threshold δ. This is without loss (see
Section 3.3). We first introduce some simplifying notation. Let (R?, γ?) denote the optimal contract
offered by the bank in equilibrium, and let q?(γ) denote the firm’s optimal response to a contract
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(R?, γ), i.e., where only the covenant threshold is changing, and the interest rate is fixed to the
optimal value. For simplicity, also let q?(γ?) = q??.
Several quantities of interest in the proof depend on the interest rate R – for instance, the
threshold qD defined in (2), and the values d(q) and d(q), defined in Lemma 5. To avoid introducing
unnecessary notation, for all the proofs in the rest of the section, we use the implicit understanding
that any such quantity is calculated under R = R?, i.e., using the optimal interest rate for the bank
in equilibrium. This should not create any confusion, since all the arguments presented will not
rely on changing R. For simplicity, we also introduce γmin
def
= d(q
??)
R?(cq??−x0) and γmax
def
= d(q
??)
R?(cq??−x0) .
We let ∆XP(q, d1)
def
= XP,L (q, d1)− E
[
XP,C (q, d1, D2)
∣∣D1 = d1] denote the expected revenue
difference between liquidation and continuation of player P ∈ {R,B}, when the bank contract is
(R?, γ), and the firm orders a generic q. If q results in liquidation conflict, note that
∆XR(q, d(q)) = 0, (20)
by the definition of d(q) (see Lemma 5).
Proof of Theorem 8. It suffices to show this result for financial covenants, as borrowing base
covenants subsume these as special cases in our setting.
When there is no liquidation conflict, by Lemma 5, the disagreement region is empty, and the
equilibrium liquidation policy followed is `R(q??, d), according to Lemma 2. As such, a contract
(R?, 0) would result in exactly the same liquidation policy in equilibrium, and would also yield
q?(0) = q??. Without loss, then, no covenant is needed in equilibrium.
For the converse, it suffices to show that, when there is liquidation conflict, γ? > 0. For the
purposes of deriving a contradiction, assume that γ? = 0. Then, q?(0) is given by the first-order
optimality condition (FOC) of piR.
We first argue for cases where the bank follows a threshold policy (see Lemma 4). By the
implicit function theorem applied to the derivative of the FOC with respect to γ, we get that
∂2piR
∂q∂γ
∣∣∣∣
q?(γ)
+
∂2piR
∂q2
∣∣∣∣
q?(γ)
dq?(γ)
dγ
= 0. (21)
We now evaluate the terms above at
(
q?(γmin), γmin
)
. Recall that q?(γmin) = q
?(0). By our
standing assumption,
∂2piR
∂q2
∣∣∣∣
q?(γmin)
=
∂2piR
∂q2
∣∣∣∣
q?(0)
< 0. (22)
To evaluate the mixed derivative above, we express the firm’s expected profits, for q > qD
and γmin ≤ γ ≤ γmax, as piR(q, γ) = piR(q, 0) +
∫ δ
d(q) ∆XR(q, u)f1(u)du, where δ is the covenant
demand threshold. To see this, note that in the disagreement region where the covenant is breached,
(d(q), δ), the firm would have otherwise continued for γ = 0, whereas it faces liquidation for γ. We
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then have
∂2piR
∂q∂γ
∣∣∣∣∣ q?(γmin),
γmin
=
[(
∂
∂q
∆XR(q, δ)
)
f1(δ)
∂δ
∂γ
] ∣∣∣∣∣ q?(γmin),
γmin
+
[
∆XR(q, δ)
∂
∂q
(
f1(δ)
∂δ
∂γ
)] ∣∣∣∣∣ q?(γmin),
γmin
.
Note that δ evaluated at (q?(γmin), γmin) is equal to d(q
?(γmin)). Therefore, by equation (20), the
second term above is zero.
To determine the sign of the first term, note that δ is increasing in γ, and f1 is positive. Thus,
at the point (q?(γmin), γmin), the sign of
∂2piR
∂q∂γ is the same as the sign of
∂∆XR(q,δ)
∂q . To evaluate the
latter, we apply the implicit function theorem to equation (20) to obtain:
∂∆XR
∂q
∣∣∣∣∣ q?(γmin)
d(q?(γmin))
=− ∂d(q)
∂q
∣∣∣∣∣
q?(γmin)
∂∆XR
∂d
∣∣∣∣∣ q?(γmin)
γmin
.
Since d is increasing in q (see Lemma 5), the sign of the first multiplier in the right-hand side is
positive. By Proposition 8, the sign of the second multiplier in the right-hand side is negative. We
conclude that the sign of ∂
2piR
∂q∂γ at (q
?(γmin), γmin) is positive.
By combining the above fact with (21) and (22), we get that
dq?(γ)
dγ
∣∣∣
γmin
≥ 0. (23)
We now focus on the bank’s expected profits. For q > qD and γmin ≤ γ ≤ γmax, we can express
them as piB(q, γ) = piB(q, 0) +
∫ δ
d(q) ∆XB(q, u)f1(u)du. Thus,
∂piB(q,γ)
∂γ = R
?(cq− x0)∆XB(q, δ)f1(δ).
By the implicit function theorem we also get dpiB(q
?(γ),γ)
dγ =
∂piB(q,γ)
∂γ
∣∣∣
q?(γ)
+ dq
?(γ)
dγ
∂piB(q,γ)
∂q
∣∣∣
q?(γ)
. Thus,
by combining the two equations above, we get
dpiB(q?(γ), γ)
dγ
∣∣∣
γmin
= R?(cq?(0)− x0)∆XB
(
q?(0), δmin
)
f1(δmin)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
+
dq?(γ)
dγ
∣∣∣
γmin︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
∂piB(q, γ)
∂q︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
∣∣∣
q?(0)
> 0,
Note that the first term above is strictly positive due to the existence of liquidation conflict (also see
Proof of Lemma 2). The second term is positive by (23). To argue that the third term is positive,
assume for the sake of contradiction that it is negative. Then, the bank can strictly increase its
profit by slightly increasing the interest rate R? (as the firm’s quantity would slightly decrease as a
result), thus contradicting optimality of the contract (R?, 0). This shows that the assumed contract
(R?, 0) is suboptimal for the bank, since she can increase her profits by including a covenant.
We now argue for the case when the bank does not follow a threshold policy, i.e., when q?(0) >
qB, s < sB. By using our results from Lemma 2 and Lemma 4, note that for d < dfb, it is optimal
for the firm to either liquidate or continue, and for the bank to liquidate. Thus, in equilibrium,
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δ? ≥ dfb > 0, which implies that a covenant is needed.
Finally, as in Lemma 3, one can show that when the optimal liquidation policy of the bank
is followed, sufficient leverage (or, equivalently, liquidation conflict) is a necessary condition for
bankruptcy risk in non-shrinking markets, and neither necessary, nor sufficient in shrinking markets.
D.4.1 Auxiliary Results
Proposition 8. When there is liquidation conflict and the bank is following a threshold policy,
∂∆XR
∂d evaluated at
(
q?(γmin), d(q
?(γmin))
)
is negative.
Proof. For simplicity of notation, we denote q?(γmin) with a generic q. We distinguish two cases.
For M ≥ M˜ , since the bank follows a non-threshold liquidation policy, d(q) = dR(q) (see Lemma 5).
Since the firm always prefers continuation for d ≥ qM (see Proposition 4), and prefers liquidation
for d < dfb(q), we must have d(q) < qM . Therefore, xR,C (q, d) =
1
2(Md− wR). By combining this
with the liquidation payoffs given by (8), we have that
∆XR(q, d) =
−
1
2(Md− wR), if d < dS
sq + (1− s)d− wR− 12(Md− wR), otherwise.
As such, ∂∆XR∂d is equal to −M2 or M˜−M2 , and is therefore negative.
For M < M˜ , d(q) = wRM <
q
M . As such, the liquidation and continuation profits are exactly the
same as above. Note, however, that d(q) < dS, by (15e) in Lemma 5. Thus,
∂∆XR
∂d is equal to −M2 ,
and the proof is complete.
D.5 Robustness of Non-Threshold Policies
Proof of Theorem 9. Since q is fixed, we no longer explicitly show the dependency of the various
functions on q. When the first period demand is D1 = d, the firm’s expected liquidation and
continuation payoffs are respectively given by:
xR,L (d) = XR,L (q, d) =

0, if d ≤ dS
(1− s)d+ sq −Rw, if dS < d ≤ q
q −Rw, if q < d.
xR,C (d) = ED2|D1=d
[
XR,C (q, d,D2)
]
= ED2|D1=d
[
(min(d+D2, q)−Rw)+
]
.
Consider the function g(y)
def
= (min(y, q)−Rw)+. Since Rw ≤ q, note that g is identically zero for
y ≤ Rw, then increases linearly, with a slope of 1, and then becomes constant, equal to q−Rw, for
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y ≥ q. In particular, g(y) is convex-concave,21 and increasing. Since xR,C (d) = E g(d + D2), and
D2 has a distribution with log-concave density, the function xR,C (d) will also be convex-concave
and increasing in d (Porteus 2002).
Consider the two functions xR,L (d) and xR,C (d). Both are positive and increasing on [0, q),
and satisfy xR,L (d) = xR,C (d) = q − Rw, ∀ d ≥ q. It can be readily checked that these functions
can have at most two intersection points on (0, q), based on the convex-concave structure of xR,C .
Furthermore, if there exists 0 < ξ < q such that xR,L (ξ−) > xR,C (ξ−) and xR,L (ξ+) < xR,C (ξ+),
then xR,L (d) < xR,C (d), ∀ d ∈ (ξ, q). The conclusion of the theorem concerning the firm follows.
The proof for the bank follows in a similar fashion, by recognizing that the expected profits
from liquidation and continuation, i.e.,
xB,L (d) = XB,L (d) = min
{
Rw(q), min(d, q) + s(q − d)+},
xB,C (q, d) = E
[
XB,C (q, d,D2)
]
= E
[
min
{
Rw(q), min(d+D2, q)
}]
,
are concave increasing on d ∈ (0, Rw), and can have at most two intersection points on this interval.
Note that the PF2 requirement is not needed, since the bank’s profits from continuation are always
concave increasing, for any second period demand distribution.
Proof of Proposition 1. (a) Note first that, since D1 >
x0
c− sM
M+s−1
≥ x0c holds almost surely,
the firm will prefer to be leveraged, and to order a quantity q > x0
c− sM
M+s−1
, for any interest rate
R ≤ 1c . In particular, since the equilibrium interest rate always satisfies this inequality, we have
q? > x0
c− sM
M+s−1
.
Recall that s2D =
Rc(M−1)
M−Rc , q
2
D =
Rx0
Rc− sM
M+s−1
. As such, the conditions in the proposition ensure
that s < s2D and q
2
D > 0 holds at R ≥ 1. Since s2D is increasing in R, and q2D is decreasing in R, we
immediately see that s < s2D and q
? > q2D must hold in equilibrium. Since M < M˜ , this implies that
the firm will always be sufficiently leveraged in equilibrium, and will follow non-threshold policies
(see Lemma 2).
(b) As above, we must have that, in equilibrium, the firm prefers to be leveraged, and q? >
(M−1+2s)x0
c(M−1+2s)−2Ms >
x0
c > 0.
Recall that sB =
(M−1)cR
2(M−cR) and qB =
R(M−1+2s)x0
cR(M−1+2s)−2Ms . The conditions in the proposition ensure
that s < sB and q? > qB holds for R = 1. Since sB is increasing in R, and qB is decreasing in R, we
have that s < sB and q? > qB must also hold for the optimal interest rate, proving that the bank
will always follow non-threshold policies in equilibrium (see Lemma 4).
21Following standard terminology, we call a function g : R → R convex-concave if it is convex on (−∞, a) and
convex on (a,∞), for some a ∈ R (see, e.g., Porteus (2002)).
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